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Homicide rates have remained consistently high in Chicago in spite of a nationwide 
downward trend in the past decades. This thesis examines the effects of public 
housing policy on homicide rates in Chicago in order to see whether or not the city's 
decision to demolish high-rise public housing projects had the intended effect of 
lowering homicide rates. 
This thesis applies game theory to build a model on expected actions of 
relocated gang members. Spatial and traditional analysis methods are used to analyze 
data to see if the game theoretic prediction holds true, and if the city's policy choices 
produced the desired effects. The data used in the thesis is compiled from crime 
statistics from the Chicago Police Department and population data from the U.S. 
Census Bureau. 
Spatiotemporal analysis indicates that homicide rates decreased in areas where 
high-rise projects were demolished, but increased in other areas. A spatial lag model 
indicates that detrimental socioeconomic factors are correlated with homicide rates 
spatially. A regression model with fixed effects for community areas indicates that the 
presence of high-rise housing increases homicide rates. 
The results emphasize the need to consider possibly unintended consequences 
in public housing policy. Based on the literature and data, preventive measures are 
vital, as bad policies and designs present the risk of a downward spiral that is almost 
impossible to break once it has begun. There are possibilities of conducting further 
research in the area in more detail and with more material under examination. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Even though crime rates have been trending downward in the United States over the 
past couple of decades, the number of homicides has continued to be high in Chicago 
and some other major cities, with 2016 proving to be a substantial upward spike in 
homicide rates. Estimates at the end of the year predict the rise in homicide rates in 
the 30 largest cities in the United States to be around 14 percent, with Chicago 
accounting for nearly 45% of that increase (Mark Berman, Chicago Tribune 2016). 
Chicago's homicide rates have been high due to gang-related violence, but 
whereas gangs fought over territory and drug sales in the 1980s and 1990s, these days 
Chicago gangs have become highly fragmented into smaller units consisting of single 
or a few city blocks, with no overarching larger street gang to organize them into 
business in the illicit drug market (Wired 2013). Many acts of violence these days 
stem from petty disputes on social media which prompt violent responses in order to 
maintain one's reputation, or face, with no connection to competition in drug dealing 
(Wired 2013). Previously, committing homicides based on petty disputes was at least 
somewhat curbed by the presence of larger gangs as their business of selling drugs 
would suffer from increased police attention in an area with a surge in homicides. 
There are two major reasons for the fragmented nature of Chicago gangs, 
which are outlined in a Wall Street Journal article (Belkin, 2012), namely the 
incarceration of major gang leaders and the subsequent severing of their 
communication ties to the outside world, as well as the demolition of the city's largest 
housing projects. Gang leaders, for example Larry Hoover of the Gangster Disciples, 
were issuing orders to their gangs from prison, but removing this line of 
communication did not remove the gang problem. Removing the head of a gang did 
not end gang activity, but instead resulted in former lieutenants of the leader 
competing to be the new leader, and this resulted in more violence. 
Defining gangs is a difficult task in itself, as “there is a mercurial subculture of 
posses, cliques, crews, taggers, and other factions, all blending into the larger world of 
gangsta rap and hip-hop” and gangs themselves “have semipermeable boundaries, 
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fluid membership, and fluctuating levels of affiliation” (Hayden 2004, 3). This 
problem of clear definition also extends to the justice system and their definitions of 
violence that is related to gangs and gang members. 
Tom Hayden (2004, 9) points out differences between cities as it pertains to 
gang-related violence, where “Los Angeles uses a definition of gang-related 
homicide, which means a killing where one of the parties is defined by police as a 
gang member or associate” but in contrast, “Chicago counts those homicides that are 
gang-motivated, that is, which further a gang interest, like a drive-by shooting or the 
killing of a drug dealer in a feud over territory.” Creatively using these definitions can 
help city administration portray the city's gang problem as being less serious than it 
truly is, but there is the limitation that a body cannot be made to disappear. 
Furthermore, ruling a death accidental or self-inflicted becomes nearly impossible if 
the deceased person is found in the street or dies in a hospital with multiple gunshot 
wounds in various locations on their body and head. 
On an interesting side note, comparing the number of homicide victims in 
Chicago (Chicago Police Department data) to the number of combat casualties 
suffered by U.S. military forces in Afghanistan (iCasualties.org) for the years 2001 
through 2016, the number of homicides in the city of Chicago is more than triple the 
number of military casualties that U.S. forces suffered in an actual war zone. By 
comparison, the number of homicides in Chicago is roughly equal to the number of 
casualties in the Iraq War between 2003 and 2011 (iCasualties.org), a grittier and 
more intense war than the conflict in Afghanistan. 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the effectiveness of the city’s policy 
decision to demolish the high-rise housing projects with the aim of driving down 
crime and homicide in these hot spots and keeping it even at the worst in other areas. 
Thus, the main research question of the thesis is: did the city’s policy of demolition 
have the desired effect on homicide rates? 
The structure of the thesis is divided in the following manner: the chapter 
following the introduction provides background information on the city’s housing 
projects and how their situation deteriorated as far as it did. Then, a chapter describing 
the theoretical and methodological approach used in the thesis. After that, there is a 
chapter that describes the game theoretic model which acts as the basis for a 
hypothesis on the consequences of the policy decision. Next, a chapter describing the 
data, and the data collection and preparation process. Following the data chapter, there 
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is a chapter containing the findings and analysis of the tests run on the data. Finally, 
there is a chapter with concluding remarks, followed by the bibliography and 
appendices. 
 
2 Background 
 
This chapter provides a description of the history of public housing in Chicago as well 
as views on the causes for the problems within public housing projects that are 
presented in the literature on the subject. The chapter is divided into three parts, with 
the first describing the history of the public housing projects and their inherent 
problems, the second covering the advent of the gang problem within the housing 
projects, and the third part providing an overview of the response from the 
administration once the problems became too severe to ignore. 
 
2.1 Problems with public housing policy 
 
The idea of providing more of a safety net for citizens became more 
widespread during the Great Depression, which led to a “massive expansion of 
government in the economic and social life of the nation” (Heathcott 2012, 361) in the 
form of president Franklin Delano Roosevelt's set of programs known as the 'New 
Deal'. Public housing also moved forward in the 'New Deal' era, with Catherine Bauer 
summarizing “two decades of discourse and debate” (Heathcott 2012, 361) in her 
book Modern Housing where she “advanced two powerful arguments: Government 
must intervene where the market has failed to provide a basic human need; and the 
most desirable, rational, and humane mode of intervention should take the form of 
well-designed mass housing for the working class” (Heathcott 2012, 361). 
The Great Depression was also a time where governmental involvement in the 
economy seemed justified to the public as well, as Smith (2009, 262) points out, 
“through public works projects, the federal government presented a physical 
justification of its new presence in the nation's economy” and that the “New Dealers 
compellingly demonstrated that public investment and state-sponsored economic 
development were essential to a modern society” in order to not only survive the 
Great Depression, but also laying the groundwork for the economic boom following 
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the Second World War, even if the New Deal planners had no knowledge of the 
coming war. 
The period following World War II was a time when the Chicago Housing 
Authority engaged in a concentrated effort of clearing slums and building public 
housing projects and over 20 years “built 23,400 apartments for low-income families, 
nearly all in African American neighborhoods” (Hunt 2009, 67). During the period, 
there was a trend of building massive housing projects where thousands of apartments 
were concentrated in small areas. Probably the most famous, or notorious, example of 
this trend was the Pruitt-Igoe housing project in St. Louis, Missouri, built in the 1950s 
and consisting of over 30 massive buildings. Hunt mentions a rise in criticism toward 
this public housing trend “after St. Louis imploded its 2,700-unit Pruitt-Igoe project in 
1972 (after a mere seventeen years of operation)” with critics condemning “the 
minimalist, repetitive, concrete towers of Pruitt-Igoe and the Robert Taylor Homes [in 
Chicago] on aesthetic grounds as sterile and unfriendly environments” (2009, 121). 
There are multiple factors that contributed to the problems in public housing in 
Chicago, and also in other places to a lesser degree. There were institutional pressures 
on the effort to build this new wave of public housing projects, and while there were 
some poor design choices, Hunt notes (2009, 122) that “blaming architects for public 
housing's failure exaggerates their importance” as they had to operate “within 
planning assumptions and policy restrictions that tightly constrained design 
possibilities.” Hunt further details (2009, 122) how an obsession with costs on behalf 
of Washington administrators forced the Chicago Housing Authority to opt for high-
rise buildings to minimize land usage, and also to ensure that public housing projects 
were built for lower prices than privately-owned residences. Heathcott (2012, 363) 
mentions that during the drafting of the New Deal era bill that regulated public 
housing Senator “Harry Byrd introduced an amendment that imposed drastic cost 
ceilings on new projects that amounted to $5,000 per unit.” 
Having budgetary deficiencies from the very beginning resulted in serious 
problems in the high-rise housing projects, with maintenance lagging behind 
immediately. Venkatesh (2009; 37, 51) mentions that residents were unable to use 
elevators due to them breaking down frequently with maintenance crews delayed 
sometimes for weeks, and in the worst cases elevators fell down shafts with 
unfortunate residents inside. With the immediate problems being so evident, it is no 
surprise that less than ten years from their inception, “the CHA's high-rise projects 
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were seen by most observers as completely misguided. They produced imposing, 
institutional environments that were easily stigmatized and readily identifiable as 
second-class housing” (Hunt 2009, 141). 
Hunt further notes the unfavorable atmosphere surrounding the effort to renew 
public housing in Chicago in the mid-20th century, where planners and administrators 
on the local and federal level knew the problems that would arise if the housing 
projects were built as planned, but no one had a creative way to work around the 
restrictions on designs, with the CHA finally acquiescing to high-rise projects to 
appease the federal PHA actors, “who, at times, behaved more like petty bureaucrats, 
less concerned with outcomes than with protecting their program from the perceived 
excesses of local authorities and potential wrath of congress” (2009, 141-142). 
This strongly indicates that the subsequent failure was not a result of a single 
bad decision on behalf of any one party involved in the process, but rather a result of 
conflicting interests for various parties at different levels of governmental 
bureaucracy. Architects and designers had a hopeful vision of futuristic housing where 
residents would enjoy a new style of living arrangements, the local housing authority 
wanted a functioning method of housing provision that would help those in need and 
not produce additional problems in the process, and the higher level bureaucrats 
wanted to avoid sending signals of being frivolous with federal money and risk the 
whole program being shut down. 
There is an issue that should not be overlooked when examining the downfall 
of public housing projects in Chicago. It appears that concentrated poverty in itself 
was not the cause for the problems that began escalating soon after the housing 
projects were finished and opened to the public. In fact, initially poverty was not 
highly concentrated in housing projects, but there was some variation in the incomes 
of the residents. Hunt mentions the issue in question by pointing out that “youth-adult 
ratios are an overlooked factor in collective efficacy and are essential to understanding 
the history of public housing’s decline” (2009, 146). 
Having too many youths compared to adults produces problems on a 
community level, making communal adult supervision of young people an almost 
impossible task. Hunt mentions that “in project communities where youths far 
outnumber adults, those seeking to enforce order faced a daunting, and perhaps 
insurmountable, demographic burden” (2009, 146). This issue does not seem to 
appear in the usual public discourse on problems in housing projects, where the focus 
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seems to be more on the poverty-related aspects of public housing residents. 
However, the issue of youth-adult ratios is not a simple explanation for 
problems that arose in public housing projects. James Q. Wilson notes that there were 
analyses that “confirmed that the rise in crime rates in the 1960s was not wholly the 
simple result of an increase in the number of young persons in the population” (2013, 
13). A further explanatory factor that may help explain the onset of problems in 
housing projects is the rate at which youth-adult ratios are changing, with faster 
changes being more likely to cause problems in the community. J. Wilson further 
notes that a “sudden increase in the number of persons at risk has an exponential 
effect on the rate of certain social problems” (2013, 14). 
Expanding on this point, Wilson goes on to explain that there is possibly “a 
‘critical mass’ of young persons such that, when that number is reached, or when an 
increase in that mass is sudden and large, a self-sustaining chain reaction is set off that 
creates an explosive increase in the amount of crime, addiction, and welfare 
dependency” (2013, 14). William J. Wilson is in agreement with this assessment, 
noting that the ‘critical mass’ “hypothesis seems to be especially relevant to inner-city 
neighborhoods and even more so to those with large public-housing projects” (1987, 
38). Thus it appears that sudden shifts toward more youth-dominated demographics 
was one of the key contributing factors that caused large problems in the Chicago 
housing projects from the very beginning. While discussing some of the later 
problems that developed in the housing projects, Hunt mentions that “social disorder 
was present in high-rises with large numbers of children right from the start” (2009, 
146). 
As was mentioned earlier, having large amounts of young people in relation to 
adults, and having those young people causing trouble is detrimental to the state of the 
community in a given area. If the youth escalate their misbehavior to crimes that 
victimize others, the situation deteriorates even further. J. Wilson explains the 
situation, noting that “predatory crime does not merely victimize individuals, it 
impedes and, in the extreme case, prevents the formation and maintenance of 
community” (2013, 16). J. Wilson further elaborates on the mechanism of how crime 
deteriorates communities by stating that “by disrupting the delicate nexus of ties, 
formal and informal, by which we are linked with our neighbors, crime atomizes 
society and makes of its members mere individual calculators estimating their own 
advantage, especially their chances for survival amidst their fellows” (2013, 16). 
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This lack of a sense of community or the deterioration of an existing 
community is worse in areas with high populations, with people lacking connections 
with their fellow residents. Dennis Roncek explains that “the size of a block’s resident 
population and its area can affect contacts among residents and their ability to detect 
or distinguish potential offenders. Larger populations and areas may decrease contact 
and interaction among neighbors” (1981, 88). It is interesting to note how this relates 
to the concept of collective efficacy that was discussed earlier. Having large 
populations with diminished connections and interactions with their fellow residents 
in combination with large youth populations causing problems leads to the 
expectation of a weak community that cannot collectively stifle the delinquency of the 
youth population in that community. Furthermore, Roncek also points out that “on 
physically large blocks, events in one part may be of little concern to those using a 
different part” (1981, 88). 
Keeping the description of large housing blocks in mind, it becomes apparent 
that housing projects such as the Robert Taylor Homes and Cabrini-Green are prime 
examples of what was discussed earlier in terms of large populations with limited 
connections and interactions amongst themselves. Also, in terms of the idea of 
collective efficacy, these massive housing projects can be seen as having large 
potentials for trouble with delinquent teenagers. W. Wilson points out that as the 
“description of the Robert Taylor Homes and Cabrini-Green in Chicago suggests, 
when large poor families were placed in high-density housing projects in the ghetto, 
both family and neighborhood life suffered” and allowed “high crime rates, family 
dissolution, and vandalism” to flourish in these areas (1987, 38). The issue of family 
dissolution also ties into the idea of crime breaking down communities as described 
by James Wilson (2013). 
One fascinating aspect of the problems facing the Chicago housing projects is 
how quickly they began after the construction of the projects and when the first 
tenants had moved in. There was no slow deterioration of communities, but rather a 
quick descent into problems. As Hunt explains, “vandalism in the CHA’s large high-
rise projects was endemic within months of occupancy, directly affecting tenant 
quality of life” (2009, 155). W. Wilson attributes much of this to the rapid shift in 
youth-adult ratios, noting that the “conditions of social disorganization are as acute as 
they are because of the unprecedented increase in the number of teenage and young 
adult minorities in these neighborhoods, many of whom are jobless, not enrolled in 
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school, and a source of delinquency, crime, and unrest” (1987, 38). Furthermore, Hunt 
notes that “while quantifying vandalism is difficult, tenant complaints and managers’ 
reports are filled with evidence that youths had the upper hand in the new projects” 
(2009, 155). 
 
2.2 The rise of gangs 
 
The situation in the new high-rise projects was troubled right from the beginning, but 
it deteriorated even further at a rapid pace. According to Hunt, an example of this 
could be seen in the Cabrini extension of the Cabrini-Green housing projects, where 
“destruction of tenant mailboxes made mail delivery insecure, damaged laundry 
machines compelled tenants to wash clothes in their apartments, and profanity-laced 
graffiti in stairwells demoralized residents” within a year of the opening of the 
extension (2009, 155). Noting the earlier mention of these high-rise projects having 
been criticized as being sterile and unfriendly environments, it is easy to imagine the 
exacerbating effect of vandalism and graffiti when it comes to the quality of life of the 
tenants. The deterioration of the community due to crime, combined with the 
deterioration of the surroundings due to vandalism undoubtedly worked to further 
facilitate the rise of more problems related to delinquency and crime. 
The delinquency problem that manifested itself in the high-rise projects from 
the very beginning proved to be a fertile ground in which more serious gang-related 
problems were able to take root. Hunt notes that during the 1960s, organized gangs 
began infiltrating Chicago’s housing projects where “they found high youth densities 
conducive to gang organizing” (2009, 157). A large population of youth not involved 
in work or education is highly vulnerable the onset of a gang problem, which did 
occur quite rapidly in the high-rise housing projects of Chicago. For gangs, it was 
unoccupied territory which they had every incentive to take hold of, and for the young 
residents the gangs provided an opportunity to earn some money, and gain a 
reputation as someone to be feared, if not respected. 
Once the problems developed in the housing projects, the effort to regain 
collective efficacy and control the delinquent youth population proved to be a 
monumental task, with differing opinions on how to achieve it. As Hunt explains, 
whereas some people working for the CHA, some tenants and other agencies 
attempted to quell the disorder and regain collective efficacy, other residents and 
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managers preferred the approach of expanding formal policing, whether by CHA 
security or by the Chicago Police Department (2009, 173). Considering how multi-
faceted the problem is and how complex it is to tackle from the safe position of an 
analyst far removed from the situation, it is no wonder that there was no unified 
approach to be found among the residents and immediate officials involved in the 
process. 
However, the proponents of increased formal policing faced another obstacle 
in addition to their disagreements with the contingent looking to increase collective 
efficacy. Hunt notes that “neither the Chicago Police Department nor the CHA’s 
senior leadership were willing to spend resources beyond ordinary levels to increase 
formal policing” (2009, 173), meaning that they were willing to provide the same 
level of policing that other neighborhoods received, which proved to be insufficient to 
contain the problems that were developing in the housing projects. 
Describing how the police operated, Hunt provides more details, mentioning 
that while CPD officers “patrolled in cars and responded to police calls, as they did in 
other neighborhoods,” they were unwilling to exceed these basic levels of policing, 
which in turn meant that “foot patrols of public housing superblocks were rare, and 
‘vertical patrols’ inside buildings were nonexistent” (2009, 173). Considering the 
physical composition of the housing blocks, this choice of strategy by the police was 
clearly inefficient as car patrols, or even foot patrols in the courtyards of the housing 
projects are unable to detect any illegal activities or disturbances within the vast array 
of stairwells, hallways, and galleries within the building blocks. However, the 
reluctance of the police to conduct these foot patrols within the buildings is 
completely understandable due to the security risks involved in sending units of two 
officers inside the massive building blocks. 
The dilemma of patrolling inside these large housing blocks also relates to the 
economic formulations of Gary Becker on the costs caused by crime compared to the 
costs incurred by fighting and punishing crime, where the entirety of the costs adds up 
to the amount of social loss (1974, 43-44). To ensure the safety of any foot patrols 
entering into the largest housing blocks, there would need to be at least two units of 
two officers, if not more, patrolling the inner corridors and stairwells as a larger 
group. Increasing the number of officers from the regular two-person unit to a 
combination of two such units increases the number of officers to four, and also 
doubles the cost incurred by the patrol, as you now need to pay four officers instead of 
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two. Also, in the case of the Robert Taylor Homes, the U-shaped positioning of the 
buildings presented a security risks for foot patrols operating in the courtyard, as the 
galleries facing the courtyard were convenient places from which to throw bottles, 
rocks, or other debris onto the patrolling officers, or in the worst case scenario, to act 
as a vantage point for sniper fire. 
Chicago’s housing projects were not the only areas facing problems during the 
decades following their opening, as there was an overall increase in crime rates all 
over the nation. As Hunt explains, “crime rates rose nationwide in the 1960s for 
numerous reasons, including rising numbers of baby-boom teenagers, increasing 
availability of handguns, and deteriorating relations between police and minority 
communities” (2009, 173). The growth of the teenage population in the housing 
projects is strongly connected to the concept of collective efficacy discussed earlier, 
and adding even more young people to the population could only work toward 
exacerbating the problem. This issue, as well as handguns being more easily available 
and relations with the police deteriorating all doubtlessly contributed to the downward 
spiral of life in the housing projects. 
Hunt goes on to explain that while the change in crime rates in Chicago was 
generally along the lines of the whole country, “in public housing, crime rates were 
devastatingly high, especially as poverty grew more concentrated in the 1970s” (2009, 
173). At this point, the crime problem in the housing projects had most likely reached 
a tipping point, from which there would be next to no chance to recover with 
conventional means. Once the gangs had become entrenched, they were the de facto 
administrators of the communities within the housing blocks, as described by 
Venkatesh (2009). 
In fact, the situation did deteriorate even further, as countermeasures proved to 
be inadequate. Hunt explains the development in the situation at the end of the 1970s, 
stating that “crime at Cabrini-Green returned to epidemic levels after the initial and 
incomplete efforts of the 1970s” (2009, 176). Hunt further elaborates, maintaining 
that “by then, poverty was intensely concentrated and deferred maintenance had 
produced grim physical conditions, and neither vertical patrols nor attempts to create 
defensible space made much difference” (2009, 176). By the beginning of the 1980s, 
it appears that the housing projects were a lost cause to the authorities, with 
countermeasures proving ineffective or too costly to implement effectively. 
The 1980s saw the rise of crack cocaine in poverty-stricken inner city areas, 
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leading to a bustling underground market run largely by gangs, as the drug was fairly 
easy to make from powder cocaine, and the form it took in the process, little nuggets 
or “rocks”, also made it easy to distribute to users (Fryer et al. 2013, 1655). However, 
as this new underground market expanded into a major economic forum where 
substantial amounts of money began circulating, it also had an effect on the gangs 
themselves. As Sudhir Venkatesh and Steven D. Levitt note, “jealousies among 
members were rife as historic allies accused one another of cheating or price gouging; 
on occasion, members of a local faction – putatively ‘brothers’ – fought with one 
another (sometimes fatally) to secure their individual capacity to profit in 
underground markets” (2000, 427-428). 
Having originally been functioning as neighborhood related groups that 
protected their members from outsiders, the explosion of the crack cocaine market 
also caused structural shifts in the gangs, as well as an overall change in the main 
purpose of the gangs. Smaller neighborhood groups or sets began to organize amongst 
themselves, forming larger conglomerations that organized themselves around the 
crack dealing business. As Venkatesh and Levitt explain, “the citywide gang 
federation had left behind the skein of a youth group involved primarily in social 
activities, minor crimes, and delinquency. They began to resemble and organized 
criminal network, interested more in consolidating their position in the city’s crack-
cocaine market” (2000, 428). A new lucrative market provided financial incentives for 
these smaller groups to organize into larger units more capable of handling the 
competition and violence involved in such an underground market. 
The need for a larger presence in an underground market stems from the very 
nature of that market. Being a market that deals in illegal substances necessitates 
some method of contract enforcement that is not overseen and administrated by the 
authorities (Sieberg 2005). When one party in a crack cocaine transaction deviates 
from the agreed-upon unwritten rules of “cash for product” whether the seller hands 
out pieces of soap or the buyer gives Monopoly money, neither one can go tell a 
police officer that they were cheated in the transaction, as they would be the one to 
immediately be in trouble with law enforcement (Sieberg 2005). Nor can sellers go to 
the police for help if a rival seller robs them of their money or product, and thus there 
is a need to enforce the rules without outside help, which requires the type of 
manpower and resources that gangs possess. 
 As there was a new purpose for the existence of gangs, one of financial profit 
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from the underground crack cocaine market, as well as the associated incentives to 
form larger units in order to survive in that market, it is no surprise that the inner 
structures of gangs also underwent a significant change. Venkatesh and Levitt describe 
this structural shift, stating that a previously “disparate collection of neighborhood 
sets, with loose ties to one another and with little collaboration” within the Black 
Kings gang now became “part of an integrated hierarchy that had eerie resonance, 
structurally and in spirit, to a corporate franchise in which members held offices and 
specific roles” and in which each smaller “constituent set was tied to the overall 
organization through trademark and fiduciary responsibilities” (2000, 428). This is a 
notable change from the youth groups engaging in social activities and petty crimes 
that were described earlier. 
 
2.3 Efforts to respond to the gang problem 
 
The response on behalf of the authorities to this trend of consolidation among the 
gangs was one of harsher sentencing and large scale incarceration in an effort to quell 
the growing gang problems within cities and housing projects. Venkatesh and Levitt 
describe this shift in policy approach, stating that this “legal and law enforcement 
strategy, sometimes referred to as a ‘law and order’ campaign, involved a shift from 
liberal programming intent on reintegrating street gang members into mainstream 
institutions to ‘gang suppression’ tactics aimed at destabilizing gang networks and 
jailing members en masse” (2000, 433). The ‘law and order’ trend had been 
developing for over a decade, and according to Hayden “the idea of a ‘war on gangs’ 
emerged piecemeal, not as a conspiracy”, with the initial national step being the 
passing of the “1968 Crime Control and Safe Streets Act” which allocated “hundreds 
of millions of dollars for cities to toughen their law enforcement capacities” (2004, 
16-17). 
Following the Safe Streets Act, governmental expenditures on anti-gang 
programs grew at a rapid pace. Hayden mentions that Richard Nixon contributed to 
this growth after running a campaign focused on ‘law and order’, and that the 
“apparatus for fighting gangs was institutionalized steadily thereafter by the passage 
of six multibillion-dollar federal anticrime bills, the drug war’s draconian penalties for 
possession of crack cocaine, mandatory minimum sentencing laws, three-strike 
penalties, and the greatest splurge of prison construction in the nation’s history” 
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(2004, 16-17). The growth of the crack market appears to coincide with the expansion 
of the law enforcement and corrections systems, quite likely that one system was 
feeding the growth of the other, and vice versa. 
The increased imprisonment rates of gang members undoubtedly affected the 
operations of gangs in Chicago’s housing projects, as a sizable number of the 
leadership of various gangs were imprisoned during this period. In fact, Venkatesh 
and Levitt point out that this large-scale imprisonment “played a critical role in the 
infrastructural development of Chicago’s largest gang federations and, to varying 
degrees, the organizations reinvented themselves when most of their leadership was 
incarcerated (2000, 435). This proved to be a problem for the authorities later on, as 
gang leaders were issuing directions for their gangs from within prison walls, which 
meant that the massive scale of incarceration did not prove to be as effective as the 
authorities would have hoped it to be. 
Due to the continuing deterioration of the situation within the housing 
projects, and the ineffective nature of mass incarceration as a tool to correct the 
development, the administration had to devise a new approach in order to rectify the 
dire conditions in the housing projects. It appears that the administration deemed these 
large housing projects a lost cause during the 1990s, and toward the end of the decade, 
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development drafted the legislation 
known as the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act (QHWRA) which was 
signed by President Bill Clinton in 1998 (hud.gov website). The purpose of this 
legislation was to reinvent how public housing is distributed to people in need, and to 
do away with the failed housing projects and the concentrated crime and poverty that 
were prevalent in those areas. 
The legislation specifically targeted the large housing projects, as Jeff Crump 
notes in his article where he states that “specific policy objectives in the QHWRA 
include: the demolition of public housing projects and the provision of vouchers that 
will facilitate the movement of public housing residents into the private housing 
market; stipulations that demolished public housing be replaced only by mixed-
income developments” (2003, 179). On the surface the change in policy seems 
warranted and perhaps even well-intentioned, but a number of issues are related to 
what the new policy’s implications are and how the changes in public housing were 
brought forward. According to Edward Goetz, there were housing authorities that 
“allowed properties to decline by neglecting upkeep, failing to re-rent vacant units, 
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and sometimes even refusing to spend HUD-allocated funds for modernization and 
improvement” (2012, 453). This type of procedure allowed the housing authorities to 
receive permission to demolish housing projects that were not originally designated 
for demolition, and acquire the land area for other developments. Even though these 
housing projects were not targeted for demolition, the willful neglect on behalf of the 
housing authorities allowed the buildings to deteriorate to a point where the 
administration permitted their demolition due to their poor condition. 
Goetz further explains that this “revised policy has led to the dismantling of 
the New Deal social welfare model of publicly owned and operated housing for the 
poor” and this old model has been replaced by a system where “housing subsidies 
come in the form of vouchers for families to use in the private market or through the 
Low Income Housing Tax Credit program funded by private investors and operated by 
private developers” (2012, 453). This is an interesting development in that it appears 
to funnel public funding into the hands of private operators that provide the services 
for those in need. Whereas before, the New Deal model was based on public welfare 
provision to the most disadvantaged portion of the population with government-
provided housing and funding, now there is a profit incentive involved on the side of 
those providing the housing services. This may lead to undesirable outcomes if the 
party providing the housing chooses to maximize their profit by cutting costs involved 
in housing provision, for which they have every incentive. 
There do appear to be issues involved in this renewed policy of public housing 
provision. As Crump points out, the “rhetoric of residential mobility and self-
sufficiency that characterizes US federal public housing policy masks a harsher reality 
for those displaced by the demolition of public housing: insecure shelter in privatized 
ghettos, low-wage working poverty, and the constant specter of homelessness and 
unemployment in deregulated urban labor markets” (2003, 279). This troubled 
sentiment is also echoed by Hayden, who mentions that the “decades of the eighties 
and nineties, when gang strife was at its worst, were a time of deindustrialization, 
privatization, and countless schemes to dismantle the New Deal tradition of 
government intervention” (2004, 53). This would further reinforce the indication of an 
apparent shift from government-provided help to a system where private operators 
provide the services in exchange for funding from the government. 
According to Crump, there is an underlying reason for this shift in policy, 
where “moving the poor out and the middle- and upper-class into select center city 
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locations, public and assisted housing policy, in concert with welfare reform, is 
intended to facilitate the spatial reorganization of urban labor markets” (2003, 180). 
This perspective on the housing policy reform casts a more cynical light on the whole 
process, where the driving force of the policy shift would not be an attempt to 
improve the living conditions of the poorest segment of the population, but rather an 
attempt to shift around populations in order to better cater to employers in urban 
areas. 
Crump also makes a strong statement on the origins of problems in housing 
projects, claiming that “even though the root cause of ‘concentrated poverty’ was the 
desire of urban planners and politicians to maintain residential segregation and save 
on land costs by building at high densities, this fact is ignored in favor of theories that 
focus on the alleged ‘contagion’ effects of population density” (2003, 181). Even 
though residential segregation has not been explicitly mentioned in the literature here, 
multiple authors have noted how the housing authorities opted, or were forced to 
minimize the use of land area by building high-rise projects. The Chicago case 
appears to be such that the city’s own housing authority wished to avoid high-rise 
buildings, but were coerced to build them through pressure from administrators in 
Washington and the PHA. 
Considering the policy choice of demolition as a method to alleviate problems 
in what had developed to be hot spots for crime over the decades, there are some 
points that need to be addressed in relation to the expected and unexpected 
consequences of this policy choice. First, we must consider who is committing crimes 
in these areas, and second, why are they doing so. The literature suggests that the ones 
initially partaking in delinquency and committing petty crimes, and later becoming 
involved in gangs appear to be mostly young, perhaps minority, residents in these 
housing projects (W. Wilson 1987, J. Wilson 2013, Hunt 2009, Venkatesh 2009). The 
second question is a more difficult one, with no real consensus to be found in the 
literature. While there is agreement on the fact that high-rise housing project buildings 
were deemed cold and unfriendly environments, there is no real indication of the 
environment itself acting as a cause for people to commit crime (Crump 2003, 
Venkatesh 2009, Hunt 2009, Duke 2009, Baumont 2009). 
Especially for those involved in gang activities, the environment ceases to be a 
major factor in why they commit crimes. As Andrew Papachristos explains, “gang 
members do not kill because they are poor, black, or young or live in a socially 
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disadvantaged neighborhood. They kill because they live in a structured set of social 
relations in which violence works its way through a series of connected individuals” 
(2009, 75). This raises doubts in regard to the effectiveness of demolition and the 
dispersal of the population, as the environment itself does not appear to cause gang 
members to commit violent acts, but rather the social network within the gang and 
amongst its members. 
However, gangs appear to be highly linked to their surroundings, with 
Papachristos et al. mentioning that “in many ways, gangs more strongly identify with 
their neighborhoods than does the typical neighborhood resident. Whereas the average 
resident may take pride in her neighborhood and participate in community life, gangs 
often view themselves as a symbolic manifestation of the neighborhood itself” (2013, 
419). The integral question here is, would removing the gang members from this 
neighborhood they identify with cause them to stop their gang activities, or would 
they realign their identification toward their new surroundings or perhaps continue 
representing their old neighborhood in the new location? 
There are positive aspects to the redevelopment of poor urban areas, but the 
focus seems to be more on what happens to those areas where troubled housing 
projects are torn down rather than what happens to the people that are displaced from 
those areas. As Catherine Baumont points out, “urban regeneration policies try to 
reverse the processes of economic, social and material decline in deprived areas”, 
where new mixed-income developments are replacing the old housing projects, and 
“the benefits from ‘social mixity’ in the neighbourhoods and positive effects of social 
and economic spillovers toward other neighbourhoods are expected” (2009, 302). 
However, even this development of formerly poverty-stricken areas faces some 
problems. As Crump points out, “the very stigma that facilitated the demolition of 
public housing projects may threaten the viability of the new mixed-income 
developments. There is little doubt that it will take a great deal of effort to convince 
white, middle-class suburbanites that former ‘no-go’ zones of the inner city are now 
safe places to invest” (2003, 185). 
What happens to those moving out of inner-city areas could be an even more 
vital issue in the redevelopment of former housing project sites. The people arriving 
in more wealthy areas are sure to face some problems, as they come from highly 
stigmatized areas and there is the potential for backlash from the residents of the areas 
receiving the relocated residents. Simply moving to a new area is unlikely to solve all 
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their problems. Joanna Duke discusses this issue, stating that “public housing 
residents who gain access to low poverty environments must also be able to actively 
engage their surroundings in a way that is meaningful to them. Physical integration, 
often seen as panacea for public housing residents, might not be sufficient” (2009, 
101). Based on this, moving residents to a more affluent area is a major contributor to 
an increase in their quality of life, but it cannot be the only one. 
As Duke further explains, “after years of spatial disenfranchisement, public 
housing residents may need additional support to overcome the barriers faced in 
mixed income settings, including opposition by their more affluent neighbours” 
(2009, 102). The opposition from residents in the receiving area is entirely 
understandable, considering the highly negative stigma attached to those who have 
been living in the city’s worst areas in high-rise housing projects. In fact, Duke notes 
that “around the US, economic integration attempts have been met with resistance by 
individuals in the receiving communities of dispersal programmes” and that “this race 
and class based resistance was coming not just from the residents in the communities, 
but from political and administrative leaders as well” (2009, 105). 
What the literature suggests is that the problems that developed within the 
massive housing projects were not caused by any single reason, but rather a 
combination of many contributing factors. These factors include demographic 
reasons, design flaws in the buildings themselves, as well as bureaucratic and funding 
issues that, through the lack of proper maintenance, caused deterioration in the 
functionality and safety of the buildings. All of these factors contributed to the rapid 
descent into poverty and squalor within the housing projects, a situation that proved to 
be so severe that rectifying it was impossible with policy measures that were less than 
drastic. 
However, as the root causes for the disastrous situation could not be narrowed 
down to a single one, it seems unlikely that fixing the situation would be successful 
with only a single drastic measure. Through the decades people grew up in 
horrendous surroundings and situations, in proverbial “slaughterhouses”, where the 
community functioned in ways highly unfamiliar to middle-class social planners. One 
does not simply erase decades of such history by moving residents into more affluent 
surroundings and expect all problems to disappear. Rather one should expect issues 
from both the people being relocated and those living in the areas into which these 
relocated people arrive. 
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3 Methodology 
 
This chapter of the thesis covers the methodology used in the formulation of a 
hypothesis, as well the literature providing support for that hypothesis. The chapter is 
divided into three parts. The first part provides the theoretical background used in the 
thesis, which is game theory, as well as literature on how gang members act as 
rational actors in the gang setting. The second part describes how the game theoretic 
framework applies to gang life in the modern age of social media. The final part of the 
chapter describes the main methodology used in the analysis, spatial data analysis. 
 
3.1 Game theoretic approach 
 
Viewing gang members from a law abiding citizen's perspective, their adherence to a 
lifestyle of crime and violence might be called, in the parlance of our time, 'irrational'. 
However, when their actions are viewed from a game theoretic perspective, their 
actions and choices within gang life are entirely rational. They have information on 
the mechanics of 'the game' of gang activity, meaning that they can figure out the 
consequences of potential choices of action or lack of action, and make their decisions 
in order to maximize their own utility based on that information. They make reasoned 
choices in order to get the best possible outcomes for themselves. This is a key 
difference between the colloquial 'rational' and the game theoretic 'rational', or as 
McCubbins and Thies (1996, 24) aptly summarize it, “rational choice is reasoned 
choice, not reasonable choice.” Shooting someone because of an insult will be 
deemed unreasonable by the public-at-large, but for gang members it is a rational 
course of action. 
In addition to the assumption of rationality of the players in the game, there is 
the assumption is that the players are also self-interested and utility-maximizing. In 
accordance with this assumption, gang members make choices that they believe will 
give them the highest possible utility payoff while minimizing the risk of producing 
negative outcomes. Within the gang life this can be ultimately narrowed down to 'kill 
or be killed', as violence is an integral part of the game, and making the wrong 
strategy choices increases the likelihood of the player being on the receiving end of 
lethal violence. The status loss that results from not reacting to provocations brands 
the person as 'a punk' or 'a mark' which signals that they are an easy target 
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(Papachristos 2009, 79). Having members with this type of reputation is bad for the 
gang's reputation as well, so they will pressure members to retaliate to aggression with 
violence. 
Interestingly enough, even if a gang member were to be incarcerated as a 
result of violent actions, it is an outcome that produces more utility for them and their 
gang than not reacting at all. For a regular citizen, this would be one of the worst 
possible outcomes, but for gang members there is an increase in status to be gained 
from incarceration, especially if it is because of a homicide they committed against a 
competing gang's member. 
The gang members participating in gang activities know the structure and rules 
of the game, or as Tom Hayden calls it, the “code of the streets”, where the structure 
of life is not dependent on societal institutions but rather a system that is “a 'cultural 
adaptation' by those outside the formal system, is a prescriptive set of rules for 
navigating the inner-city streets and schools whether one is gang-affiliated or not” 
(2004, 3). This implies that the rules are known not only to those involved in the gang 
life, but they are universally known to everyone living in inner-city areas with or 
without gang affiliation or activity. 
Sequential games “entail strategic situations in which there is a strict order of 
play. Players take turns making their moves, and they know what players who have 
gone before them have done.” (Dixit and Skeath 2004, 45). Gang violence can be 
viewed as a sequential game, as there is a back-and-forth mechanic at work in the 
sequence of violent acts. One party commits an act of violence, the other party 
assesses the damage, considers their strategy options and choose a strategy to follow, 
most likely a strategy of retaliation as reputation is an integral factor in the game and 
not retaliating results in a reduction in reputation. The first party then considers their 
strategy choices and possible outcomes and responds to this retaliation and the game 
progresses over time, one step at a time. 
 David Kreps and Robert Wilson discuss sequential rationality, stating that each 
player’s “every decision must be part of an optimal strategy for the remainder of the 
game” according to the player's beliefs about how the game has evolved prior to their 
decision and how it will develop after their move (1982, 863). Accordingly, should a 
gang come under attack, be it directed at them physically or toward their reputation 
through some slight or insult, they are obliged to retaliate and show that this 
aggression will not stand, as unchecked aggression sends a signal to other rival gangs 
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that this particular gang is an easy target for future transgressions. Failing to react to 
provocations inevitably leads to a loss in status, which in turn increases the likelihood 
for future attacks and aggression from other rivals, and thus can be deemed the worst 
strategy option a gang under attack can choose. 
The only viable option is to signal a willingness and capability to engage in 
violence, be it in retaliation to the attacker or an attack on some other rival gang. 
Papachristos (2009) likens gang violence to a pecking competition between chickens, 
where the loser suffers a loss in status, while the winner may reduce their chances of 
being challenged in the future based on winning this particular contest. The need to 
save face and retain status leads to gang violence being reciprocal much in the manner 
of a sequential game (Papachristos et al. 2013). 
Gang leaders act as coordinators and devise larger scale strategies towards 
which they direct the actions of their lieutenants and their soldiers. It can be safely 
assumed that any established leader in a smoothly operating gang is also a strong 
leader, considering how important reputations are in the world of criminal gangs. 
Leaders showing weakness are likely to be deposed and replaced by someone with 
more perceived capabilities toward violent acts and an astute ability to run the gangs 
financial endeavors. Experimental research into coordination games shows the 
importance of credible leadership, as Wilson and Rhodes state: “The simple presence 
of a leader, however, is no guarantee that coordination problems will be solved. If 
followers are uncertain about their leader's incentives, then they can easily ignore 
leadership. Credibility is a central concern for followers, and when leaders lack it they 
are easily ignored” (1997, 789). 
The incarceration and subsequent severing of the communication ties of top 
leaders in gangs created a nearly unsolvable dilemma for their lieutenants and their 
cliques of underlings. This is displayed in the research of Wilson and Rhodes, where 
they discovered that “subjects found decentralized coordination games to be 
extremely difficult” (1997, 788). Each lieutenant has an incentive to strive for the top 
leadership spot and not yield to their lieutenant peers, both for reputation and the 
utility benefits of being the leader of the entire gang. Allowing another lieutenant to 
take the leadership position would signal passivity and non-aggression, which leads to 
losses in reputation and the consequences of that reputation loss. For the overall 
functioning of the gang this is problematic as well, as there is no large scale strategy 
being implemented, and no lieutenant can agree with another lieutenant's suggestions 
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even if they are prudent, due to the reputation loss connected to conceding to one's 
competitors. 
Having a higher status or reputation is also a factor in decision-making in 
scenarios which are not gang-related. Experimental research has shown that a higher 
status helps in making successful coordinated efforts through signaling. As Eckel and 
Wilson (2007, 328) point out, “the play of a commonly observed agent does not 
merely make one equilibrium more salient or focal,” but instead that the “play is more 
effective in influencing others if the observed agent has high status.” An observed 
actor can signal a strategy in an effort to coordinate other players, but as Eckel and 
Wilson (2007, 328) state, while “signaling a strategy serves as a coordination device, 
but that signal is more powerful when it comes from an agent with higher status.” 
The importance of reputations is further reinforced when looking into research 
on youth gangs in communities with lower populations, as those gangs are looking to 
project a threat level similar to larger gangs in large cities. Howell (2007, 46) points 
out that “youth gang problems are often difficult to assess, and gangs are often 
shrouded in myths,” and that many of these “myths are promulgated by the gangs 
themselves in order to enhance their status and aura of danger.” While the 
consequences of these small community youth gangs not having enough of a 
reputation are not severe, for gangs in larger cities lacking in reputation the 
consequences are dire as shown in Papachristos 2009, 2013. 
 
3.2 The impact of social media 
 
Whereas antagonistic or provocative signaling toward rival gangs had to be done 
physically in earlier decades, either by spraying graffiti on the rival's territory or by 
“face-to-face” interactions where the opponent sees the antagonist, now the effort of 
signaling is greatly diminished with the proliferation of social media and hand-held 
devices that allow easy access to these outlets. 
Along with ease of access, sending antagonistic signals over social media 
allows relative safety, depending on the where the user is when the signal is sent. A 
gang member can send derogatory comments toward rival gangs while at home with 
friends, and the danger of retaliation only materializes once they are outdoors. 
Previously, having to venture into 'enemy territory' to spray graffiti, or flashing hand 
signals to rivals that can see you, presented an immediate danger of violent 
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retribution. 
The advent of smartphones is a fairly recent phenomenon, with the 
introduction of Apple’s first iPhone in 2007 being seen as the starting point of the 
smartphone revolution (The Guardian 2012). In the following ten years, the 
proliferation of smartphone technology has given mobile internet access to an ever-
increasing percentage of the population in developed countries. Even the poorest 
segments of populations often possess some type of smartphone, as new and less 
costly alternatives have been introduced into the market. 
However, as smartphones are hand-held and functional everywhere in the city, 
there is risk involved in posting provocations in the wrong place, the most prominent 
example being the death of 18-year-old Joseph Coleman in 2012. Coleman, going by 
the alias Lil Jojo in his rap career, had been involved in a back-and-forth feud with 
another Chicago rapper, Keith Cozart, whose stage name is Chief Keef. The two had 
been exchanging insults on social media and in songs, and the feud ended in Coleman 
being shot to death by an affiliate of Chief Keef after posting his location on Twitter, 
and in effect daring someone to do something (Wired 2013). 
With the advent of Facebook Live, a direct video streaming service, there have 
been occasions of people streaming videos and being shot to death while doing so. 
There is a two-fold risk in streaming videos when involved in the gang life, as 
adversaries are able to find out your location by looking at the video and recognizing 
the area from what is seen of the surrounding area, and also that the person streaming 
the video has their attention focused on the device and the act of shooting a video, 
which allows the opponents to stealthily approach and perform a surprise attack. 
As the costs of signaling have gone down with social media, there are 
naturally more provocations to be found on various platforms, which is conducive to 
an ongoing cycle of violence as retaliation to provocations is necessary in order to 
preserve one's reputation, and also their gang's reputation. The fragmentation of 
gangs, the lack of coordination among the small fragments and their members, and the 
constant flow of antagonism on social media all contribute to exacerbating the 
situation in Chicago. 
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3.3 Spatial Data Analysis 
 
The starting point of spatial data analysis is Tobler's First Law of Geography, which 
postulates that “everything is related to everything else, but near things are more 
related than distant things” (Waldo R. Tobler 1970, 236). An intuitive example to help 
illustrate the concept could be if a house owner’s neighbor gathers all the leaves in 
their yard and burns them, the smoke will be seriously detrimental to the house owner 
next door. However, if someone gathers leaves and burns them two blocks down the 
street, the house owner can probably smell the smoke, but it will not have much of an 
impact. If someone on the other side of town burns their pile of leaves, the house 
owner in our example most likely could not tell that the event has occurred, unless 
they possess some sensitive scientific equipment that measures a slight increase in 
airborne micro-particles as a result of the leaf-burning. 
 Of course, Tobler’s First Law of Geography does not only apply to the burning 
of leaves. There is justification for considering the effect of spatial factors when 
examining statistical information that is divided into some type of spatial areas, for 
example counties or other administrative areas. Basile Chaix, Juan Merlo, and Pierre 
Chauvin argue that “people may be affected not only by the characteristics of their 
local administrative area of residence, but also by the context beyond these 
administrative boundaries, as their social activities may encompass a broader space” 
(2005, 517). People in community areas are not living in separate, isolated islands 
without any interaction with the surrounding community areas, with gated 
communities being the exception. Normal city administrative areas, however, are 
affected by and affect the surrounding areas in terms of various social and economic 
factors, and also in terms of criminal activities. 
 In their examination of health care use and outcomes in France, Chaix et al. 
“propose an approach for defining the social factors of the context that considers 
spatial neighbourhoods, defined as continuous spaces around individual places of 
residence, rather than territorial neighbourhoods arbitrarily defined by administrative 
boundaries” (2005, 517-518). Among many things, this approach is useful in 
analyzing health issues, for example the spread of contagious diseases, and it can also 
be utilized to model the occurrence and spread of various social issues, including that 
of crime. 
 In the concluding remarks of Chaix et al.’s article, they note that instead of a 
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straight forward statistical approach that discretely separates observations into 
different administrative areas, “in many social epidemiological studies, investigating 
geographical variations across continuous space using spatial modeling techniques 
and place indicators that capture space as a continuous dimension may be more 
appropriate” to describe and explain spatial variations in health outcomes (2005, 524). 
Whereas traditional statistical approaches might not account for interactive effects 
between adjacent neighborhoods, a spatial approach can help extract factors that affect 
statistical outcomes and that statistical analyses could otherwise miss. 
 As was mentioned earlier, modeling and estimating the spread of contagious 
diseases is something for which spatial data analysis is extremely useful. Interestingly 
enough, the historical roots of spatial data analysis can be traced back to such an 
endeavor in the 19th century. Michael D. Ward and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch describe 
John Snow’s efforts to trace a cholera outbreak in London in 1854, where Snow 
discovered the outbreak to be “a result of Soho inhabitants (and others) drinking water 
from a pump on Broad Street, which had become infected from the burial site of many 
of the victims of the Cholera epidemic” (2008, 9). In fact, Snow’s work is widely 
known today, and as Ward and Gleditsch note, “Snow's maps of London have become 
classics illustrating how spatial correlation can embody causal thinking” (2008, 9). 
 In today’s world, spatial data analysis is applied in multiple fields, and it is 
becoming more prevalent in the social sciences as well. Luc Anselin, one of the 
prominent figures in the discipline’s development, offers a concise description of the 
discipline, stating that “in general terms, spatial analysis can be considered to be the 
formal quantitative study of phenomena that manifest themselves in space. This 
implies a focus on location, area, distance and interaction” in the way described in 
Tobler’s words mentioned earlier (1989, 2). The effects of the spatial distribution of 
variables and their interactions in space are taken into consideration in spatial data 
analyses. As an example, James P. LeSage and R. Kelley Pace describe such an 
interaction, where “spatial dependence reflects a situation where values observed at 
one location or region, say observation i, depend on the values of neighboring 
observations at nearby locations” (2009, 2). 
 As traditional regression analyses focus on the correlational relationships 
between variables without any emphasis on spatial effects, the discipline has similar 
statistics that account for those factors. As Arthur Getis explains, “whereas correlation 
statistics were designed to show relationships between variables, autocorrelation 
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statistics are designed to show correlations within variables, and spatial 
autocorrelation shows the correlation within variables across space” (2007, 493). 
While non-spatial approaches have the assumption of observations being independent 
from each other, the measure of spatial autocorrelation can be used to indicate to what 
degree similar values of observations are clustered in spatial distributions. Getis 
further argues “that spatial autocorrelation should be and become a prominent subject 
for study in all the social sciences” (2007, 495). 
 There are multiple measures for spatial autocorrelation provided in the 
plethora of spatial data analysis software, slightly varying in their methods of measure 
and focus. However, as Getis points out, “among many measures of spatial 
association, Moran's I statistic is the most widely used measure of and test for spatial 
autocorrelation” (2008, 298). Ward and Gleditsch prove a more detailed explanation 
of the statistic, stating that “Moran's I compares the relationship between the 
deviations from the mean across all neighbors i, adjusted for the variation in y and the 
number of neighbors for each observation” (2008, 20). The value of Moran’s I ranges 
from -1 to 1, which indicates the degree to which similar values are clustered in space. 
 When Moran’s I values are positive, there is an indication of “stronger positive 
(geographical) clustering, i.e. that values of neighboring units are similar to one 
another” (Ward and Gleditsch 2008, 20). Paul R. Voss, David D. Long, Roger B. 
Hammer, and Samantha Friedman provide an even simpler explanation, stating that 
“positive values of Moran's I suggest spatial clustering of similar values,” and they go 
on to explain that negative values in Moran’s I “(infrequent in the social sciences) 
suggest that high values are frequently found in the vicinity of low values” (2006, 
377). A simple visual representation of the lowest Moran’s I value would be a map 
that looks like a chessboard, with opposite (black and white) values being perfectly 
evenly distributed to create the distinctive chessboard pattern. 
 In order to calculate Moran’s I, the spatial units and their neighbors are 
assigned weights, which results in “an n x n spatial weights matrix, W, defining the 
neighborhood structure within which spatial dependence is believed to operate. W 
often is row-standardized (each row summing to unity)” (Voss et al. 2006. 377). There 
are alternative methods of assigning weights to neighbors, some of which harken back 
to the chess analogy earlier. For example, a rook contiguity assigns weights to 
neighbors horizontally or vertically adjacent to the unit of observation, in the same 
way that a rook piece moves in chess. Another example is a queen contiguity, in 
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which weights are assigned similarly to the queen piece’s movement in the game, 
namely horizontally, vertically and diagonally. Also, weights can be assigned to apply 
only to the closest neighbors (first order), or the closest and second closest (second 
order) and so on, with neighbors further away receiving less weight than closer ones. 
 The analysis of the data will be performed with two software packages, GeoDa 
and GeoDaSpace. The GeoDa software is geared more towards representing spatial 
characteristics in data through the use of visual representations, i.e. maps, which will 
be applied in the spatiotemporal analysis of changes in variables over time in 
Chicago. On the other hand, the GeoDaSpace software “has been designed for the 
estimation and testing of spatial econometric models” without the use of maps and 
graphs (Coro Chasco 2013, 120). This software will be used in a supplementary 
analysis of socioeconomic data for the year 2012. 
 
4 Model 
 
This section of the thesis outlines the game in which the relocated gang member 
residents and the gang member or non-gang member residents of the receiving areas 
take part. The game is presented in two different forms, which are based on the 
primary assumptions about the situation and how the game proceeds. First, the game 
is considered as a sequential game where the relocated gang members arrive in the 
new area and have the first move. This version of the game is presented as an 
extended form game with the game tree displaying the choices and outcomes for all 
players (Figure 1). 
Second, the game is considered as a simultaneous game, or a game of 
incomplete information. This version of the game is presented in matrix form. In this 
version, the players make their choices based on the knowledge they have of their 
opponents and of the game itself, but without actual knowledge of what their 
opponents’ choices are. The players make their choices under uncertainty, trying to 
predict the opponents’ responses to their own strategy choices and formulate a way to 
produce the best outcomes for themselves. 
The preferences of the players differ somewhat between the different types of 
residents in the areas receiving the relocated gang members from the demolished 
housing projects. Whereas the relocated gang members and the resident gang 
27 
 
 
members both participate in the “gang game”, the non-gang residents have the 
preferences of normal law-abiding citizens not looking to engage in violent conflict in 
order to gain illegal income and street reputation. 
 
Figure 1 
 
The variables considered in the model contribute to the players' final utility 
from choosing particular strategies. A key assumption for the model is that all players 
involved in the game are rational, self-interested individuals looking to maximize 
their utility. Another assumption is that the players know how the game is played and 
they know that the other players have this same information as well. Thus their 
strategies are formulated based on predictions of what the other players will do to 
maximize their utility. Based on these assumptions, the rest of this chapter will 
provide a clarification of the choices and payoffs of the players involved in each of 
the final nodes. 
First, an explanation of the variables under consideration. Each player's payoff 
is calculated as utility (U), where the higher the utility is, the better the outcome is for 
that player. Each player looks to maximize their utility by their strategy choices and 
knowledge of what other players are likely to do. The first variable to consider is 
power (P) which means control of the area, for example having the ability to have a 
presence in the area with groups of gang members posted on street corners or parks 
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and other outdoor locations. When conflict occurs, the players receive a share (f) of 
power (P) based on the results of the conflict, with the total of shares included in (f) 
adding up to 1. 
The second variable contributing to a player's utility is status (St), which is 
perhaps the single most important variable for gang members to take into account. 
Having a high status (St) can help secure a share of power (P) even for smaller gangs 
as it signals a willingness to engage in violence which would result in costs for any 
aggressors. Having a high share of power (P) but a low status (St) sends a signal to 
rival gangs that taking over this territory would be beneficial and not likely to be very 
costly. 
Closely related to the share of power (P) is the income from crime (I). Having 
control of an area allows gangs to, for example, post groups in various locations to 
sell illegal narcotics or to extort protection money from residents or businesses, or to 
commit robberies, all of which contribute to the final amount of income (I) the player 
receive. Again, having a high status (St) and a higher share of power (P) contribute to 
a player's ability to receive higher amounts of income from criminal activities (I). 
With violence and conflict being integral parts of the game, there are variables 
addressing to results of these conflicts. When players choose aggressive actions, they 
incur the costs of fighting (F), which vary from higher with mutual aggression where 
both players commit and receive violence to lower where one player unilaterally 
inflicts violence and their costs are mainly the effort of committing the violent act. 
When one player unilaterally receives violence without fighting back, they incur the 
cost of victimization (V), which entails both the physical harm incurred in the attack 
as well as the mental anguish of humiliation. 
Finally, there are two variables to account for the law-abiding segments of the 
population, or strategy choices that abide by legal restrictions. Those choosing to 
abide by the law receive some amount of income from work (W) and if they are not 
participating in any conflicts or being victimized by anyone else also receive the 
benefits of safety (S). They are able to conduct their daily business without fear of 
violence or a need to commit violence in order to maintain status (St). 
The game begins with “nature” placing the relocated gang members in areas 
with residents who are either gang members or non-gang members. Because of this, 
there are a total of three players in the game, with two facing each other in each node. 
Relocated gang members are a participant in each node, but their opponent changes 
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based on where “nature” places them, meaning that the opposing players will be either 
gang members or non-gang members. 
 
4.1 Relocated gang members vs Gang members 
 
When nature places the relocated gang members into a gang area, we end up in 
the left-hand side of the game tree, where the outcomes for the two players are found 
in nodes 1 through 4. In this subgame the relocated gang members play the game 
against established gang members who already live in and control the area. The 
payoffs for each node are as follows. 
 
Node 1 – Crime and Hostile 
RP – U = fP+St+dI-F 
G – U = (1-f)P+St+(1-d)I-F 
 
Starting with node 1, the first variable to consider for the players is power (P), mostly 
meaning the amount of control the gang has in the contested area. In node 1 where 
relocated gang members (RP) decide to become involved in criminal activity (crime) 
and the gang members (G) already established in the area decide to react with hostility 
(hostile), their power shares are determined by the fighting, meaning that the share (f) 
is somewhere between or equal to 0 and 1, with RP receiving the share fP and G the 
remainder (1-f)P. The same applies for income from criminal activities (I) where both 
players are fighting for some share (d) of the available income from crime, for 
example drug dealing, theft, robberies, and so on. Again, RP receives the share dI and 
G the remainder (1-d)I. Because both RP and G engage in hostilities, their street 
credibility or status (St) is maintained or increased, and both suffer the costs involved 
in engaging in fighting (F). 
 
Node 2 – Crime and Non-hostile 
RP – U = fP+St+dI-F (f=1, d=1) 
G – U = (1-f)P+(1-d)I-V (1-f=0, 1-d=0) 
 
The situation in node 2 is a result of relocated gang members (RP) deciding to be 
involved in criminal activities (crime) but the established gang members (G) choose 
not to react to this provocation (non-hostile). With this choice of non-hostility, RP is 
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able to push out G and take control of the area and the income from crime in the area, 
which results in RP having all the power (P) and all the income from crime (I) and 
thus the shares become f=1 and 1-f=0, and d=1 and 1-d=0. As a result of not reacting 
to the provocation, G suffers a reputation loss and receives no status (St) while RP 
maintains a good street reputation (St). Additionally, G suffers the high costs of being 
victimized (V) by the aggressive newcomer RP as the area is taken over, and RP only 
suffers a lower cost of fighting (F) in being hostile toward their non-aggressive 
opponents. 
 
Node 3 – Non-crime and Hostile 
RP – U = fP+dI+W-V (f=0, d=0) 
G – U = (1-f)P+St+(1-d)I-F (1-f=1, 1-d=1) 
 
In node 3 the situation is reversed, with RP choosing a strategy of abiding by the law 
and seeking legal employment (non-crime) and G choosing to react with hostility 
(hostile) to the new people arriving in the area. As a result of RP's strategy choice, G 
receives the entirety of power (P) and income from crime (I) making the shares f=0 
and 1-f=1, and d=0 and 1-d=1. By choosing a passive strategy, RP suffers a status 
loss, whereas G maintains a good reputation (St). The choice of being law-abiding 
citizens gives RP some amount of income from work (W), which may or may not be 
equal to the potential income from crime (I). Finally, RP suffers the high costs of 
being victimized (V) by the hostile actions of G who only suffer lower costs of 
fighting (F) from attacking non-resisting opponents. 
 
Node 4 – Non-crime and Non-hostile 
RP – U = fP+dI+S+W (f=0, d=0) 
G – U = (1-f)P+(1-d)I+S (1-f=1, 1-d=1) 
 
In node 4 both participants choose non-aggressive approaches, with RP deciding not 
to commit crimes (non-crime) and G choosing a passive approach to the new arrivals 
(non-hostile). The result of these strategy choices gives G the entirety of power (P) 
and income from crime (I), with the shares being f=0 and 1-f=1, and d=0 and 1-d=1. 
G effectively keeps their established control of the area and the income afforded by 
criminal activities in the area. In this two-player encounter both RP and G receive the 
benefit of safety (S), but as a result of a symmetrical approach of non-aggression, both 
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participants suffer a loss of reputation (St). RP also receives some amount of income 
from work (W) from the law-abiding approach, which again may or may not be equal 
to the income from crime (I). 
 
Summary – Relocated gang members vs Gang members 
 
Due to the structure and rules of the game, an examination of the payoffs reveals that 
both players have a dominant strategy that they should choose for the best possible 
outcomes. For relocated gang members (RP) the dominant strategy is to become 
involved in criminal activities (crime) no matter what the opponent chooses, as their 
payoffs in node 1 are higher than those in node 3, and their payoffs in node 2 are 
higher than those in node 4. For the resident gang members (G), there is also a 
dominant strategy of choosing a hostile approach (hostile) to the newcomers, as their 
payoffs in node 1 are higher than in node 2, and their payoffs in node 3 are higher 
than in node 4. 
The loss of status for non-aggression is highly influential for the players, as it 
affects their standings in games against other gangs in the area. Thus, safety in this 
this two-player game will have an adverse effect on the participant's chances when 
facing a different opponent. This is something that should be noted, as the games 
between two participants do not happen in a vacuum, but other potential players 
observe the interactions between the players and may adjust their future actions based 
on these observations. Non-aggressive players will be more likely to come under 
attack from other players in the area. For the purposes of this thesis, the model is 
simplified to focus only on the two-player interaction, but the effects of the choices in 
this game affect their payoffs in future games, which should be kept in mind, and 
which is partially modeled by the status variable (St). 
In order to find the possible Nash equilibria in the subgame, backward 
induction can be applied to see what strategy choices each of the players will choose 
at various decision points in the subgame. Starting with the first decision point where 
RP has already chosen the “crime” strategy, G faces the choice between nodes 1 and 
2, with the respective strategies being “hostile” and “non-hostile”. Considering the 
payoffs between the two nodes, G will receive a better utility payoff if they choose 
“hostile” and end up in node 1. In the second decision point where RP has chosen a 
strategy of “non-crime”, G has to choose between the strategies “hostile” and “non-
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hostile”, and nodes 3 and 4 respectively. Again, choosing the “hostile” strategy 
produces the better outcome in node 3 and G is incentivized to choose it. 
Working with this information provided by the initial stage of backward 
induction, it is possible to reduce the possible outcomes for RP in this subgame to 
nodes 1 and 3 based on what G will choose in their later decision points. Thus, RP 
will face the choice of the “crime” strategy and ending up in node 1 and the “non-
crime” strategy and ending up in node 3. RP receives a notably higher payoff in node1 
and is therefore incentivized to choose the strategy of “crime”. 
Backward induction solves this subgame into the Nash equilibrium (crime; 
hostile, hostile) which is in accordance with the earlier formulation that revealed that 
both players have a dominant strategy in this particular subgame. G has strong 
incentives to choose a strategy of hostility in every situation in the game, and RP also 
has strong incentives to choose a symmetrically opposite strategy of hostility as well. 
A further complication to the game is the fact that status losses incurred in this two-
player game have dire effects on the players' situation in the area where other players 
may appear to participate in a new iteration of the same game. 
 
4.2 Relocated gang members vs Gang members – simultaneous 
game 
 
 
Figure 2 
33 
 
 
 
 Gang member resident 
Hostile Non-hostile 
RP 
crime 1* 2 
non-crime 3 4 
 
 
Considering this subgame as a simultaneous game with limited information about the 
opponent's strategy choices (Figure 2), the game can be represented as a 2x2 matrix 
game. Here the players simply choose their strategy without knowing what the 
opponent chooses, but rather by considering the possible outcomes that their strategy 
choices and the opponent's responses would produce. It is possible to solve the 
subgame for possible Nash equilibria by examining the payoffs in the matrix cells and 
see whether either of the players has an incentive to change their strategy in order to 
receive a better payoff. 
Starting with the socially preferable non-violent outcome where the relocated 
gang members choose a strategy of “non-crime” and the resident gang members 
choose the “non-hostile” strategy, the payoffs for both players include safety (S), but 
both players suffer a significant loss to their status (St) which is a very detrimental 
outcome for both parties. 
RP can be much better off by choosing the “crime” strategy and moving to 
node 2 where they receive better results with power (P), status (St), and income from 
crime (I). Also, G can improve their payoffs from node 4 by choosing the “hostile” 
strategy and moving from node 4 to node 3. Neither player has an incentive to stay in 
node 4, but both would prefer to change their strategy choice instead. 
If RP has chosen “non-crime” as their strategy, and G has chosen “hostile”, 
then RP again has an inventive to change their strategy to “crime” and move to node 
1. Also, if the roles are reversed and RP has chosen “crime” and G has chosen “non-
hostile”, G can receive a much better payoff by changing their strategy choice to 
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“hostile”. Thus, both players will have a dominant strategy in the game as they 
receive better payoffs in any situation with the choice of a single strategy. For RP the 
dominant strategy is “crime”, as they will be better off in node 2 compared to node 4, 
and in node 1 compared to node 3. On the other hand, the dominant strategy for G is 
“hostile”, as they are better off in node 3 compared to node 4, and in node 1 compared 
to node 2. 
 
4.3 Relocated gang members vs Non-gang members 
 
When nature places the relocated gang members into an area without a gang presence, 
we will consider the right-hand side of the game tree, and the payoffs for the two 
players are located in nodes 5 through 8. In this subgame the relocated gang members 
are involved in playing the game against law-abiding citizens living in the area. 
 
Node 5 – Crime and hostile 
RP – U = P+St+I-F 
NG – U = W-F 
 
The first node in this subgame, node 5, results in the relocated gang members (RP) 
choosing to become involved in criminal activities (crime), and the non-criminal 
residents of the area (Non-G) responding with hostility to the new arrivals (hostile). 
As there is no competition for power (P) between two gangs, RP receives the entire 
benefits of the variable by default as they choose to continue the gang life. By acting 
aggressively, they also receive the benefits of status (St). Due to a lack of competition 
they also receive the entirety of the available income from crime (I). However, as the 
local population (Non-G) is hostile toward them, RP suffers the costs of fighting (F) in 
the conflict with the locals. This cost of fighting is lower than it is against other gang 
member opponents (G). The non-criminal residents of the area (Non-G) receive the 
usual amount of income from work (W), but suffer the costs of fighting (F) against the 
newly arrived gang members. 
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Node 6 – Crime and Non-hostile 
RP – U = P+St+I-F 
NG – U = W-V 
 
In node 6 the relocated gang members (RP) have chosen a strategy of continuing 
criminal activities (crime) while the local residents (Non-G) choose a passive 
approach (non-hostile) toward them. As a result, RP receives all the power (P), as well 
as status (St) and all the income from crime (I). The local residents (Non-G) receive 
their income from work (W), but also suffer the high costs of victimization (V) while 
RP only incurs the lowered costs of fighting (F) a soft target. 
 
Node 7 – Non-crime and Hostile 
RP – U = W-V 
NG – U = W+S-F 
 
The situation in node 7 is the result of relocated gang members (RP) choosing a 
strategy of abiding by the law (non-crime) but the local residents still choosing a 
strategy of hostility (hostile). For RP, this strategy combination gives some amount of 
income from work (W) but also has them suffering the high costs of victimization (V), 
which in this context range from ostracism and humiliation to outright physical 
attacks. Due to their non-aggression, RP also suffers a loss of status (St). The non-
criminal residents (Non-G) receive their normal income from work (W), and have the 
benefits of safety (S), but also suffer the low costs of fighting (F) non-aggressive 
opponents. 
 
Node 8 – Non-crime and Non-hostile 
RP – U = W+S 
NG – U = W+S 
 
In the final node of the game, node 8, RP has chosen a strategy of not engaging in 
criminal activities (non-crime) and Non-G has chosen an approach of non-aggression 
(non-hostile). As a result, the payoffs for the players are identical. Both RP and Non-G 
receive income from work (W) and receive the benefits of living in a safe 
environment (S). However, due to their non-aggressive strategy choice, RP also 
suffers a loss of status (St). 
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4.4 Relocated gang members vs Non-gang members - simultaneous 
 
 
Figure 3 
 
 Non-G resident 
Hostile Non-hostile 
RP 
crime 5* 6 
non-crime 7 8 
 
If the model is altered to a situation where the relocated gang members and the non-
gang member residents of the new area do not know what their opponent's strategy 
choices are (Figure 3), the subgame can be represented as a 2x2 matrix. Here the two 
players have their two strategy choices, being “crime” and “non-crime” for the 
relocated gang members, and “hostile” and “non-hostile” for the non-gang member 
residents. 
The socially optimal and preferred outcome would be node 8, where RP 
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chooses a strategy of “non-crime” and Non-G chooses a strategy of “non-hostile”. In 
this situation everyone lives in peace with income for both players coming from legal 
employment. However, if RP considers their utility payoffs for their strategy choices 
when Non-G has chosen a strategy of “non-hostile”, they can improve their situation 
by choosing the strategy “crime” instead. Having power, status, and income from 
crime outweighs the utility of having safety and a legal income, and thus the players 
end up in node 6. 
Conversely, when Non-G considers their options in node 6, they can improve 
their utility outcome by switching their strategy from “non-hostile” to “hostile” and 
moving over to node 5. They are better off by resisting the newcomers, be it through 
calling the police or shooing loitering gang members away from their storefronts than 
they would be by simply acquiescing to the new criminal activities. 
Neither player has an incentive to move away from their strategy choices in 
node 5, making it the Nash equilibrium for this subgame. It is also the only Nash 
equilibrium present in the subgame, as RP would also prefer moving to node 5 if the 
game somehow ended up in node 7 where RP chooses “non-crime” and Non-G 
chooses “hostile”. Considering this, it becomes apparent that RP has a dominant 
strategy in this subgame, as they receive better payoffs in all situations by choosing 
the strategy of “crime”. 
 
5 Data 
 
The data used in the analysis is collected from two main sources: the annual reports of 
the Chicago Police Department (CPD), and the City of Chicago's own Data Portal 
(CCDP) website (https://data.cityofchicago.org/). The CPD annual reports include 
detailed information on index crimes divided disaggregated to a community area 
level, and the reports also include population data disaggregated to a community area 
level from the United States Census Bureau's census surveys in 2000 and 2010. 
Unfortunately, the CPD annual reports are only available up to and including 
the year 2010, but the CCDP website provides a listing of all individual crimes 
starting from 2001, with detailed information on the time, location and type of crimes 
reported. The exact location of crimes is not revealed, with the last numbers of street 
addresses censored from the data sets. Every crime is coded with the community area 
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number, which provided a method of constructing a data set for homicides for the 
period where the CPD reports are no longer available. For the years 2011-2016, the 
raw data was first filtered to exclude all crimes that were not homicide, and as each 
crime is coded with the community area number, the second step was to do a count of 
how many times homicides were recorded in each community area for any year in the 
period, which results in an output consistent with the data provided in the CPD annual 
reports. 
The lower temporal cutoff for the data is effectively dictated to be the year 
2000, as that is the first year when the CPD reports list data disaggregated into 
community areas as well as police districts, and not only police districts as was done 
prior to that point. Having data at the community area level is a requirement for the 
technical aspect of the analysis, as the spatial map information (shape file) divides the 
city into community areas. The CPD reports, the CCDP data, and the CCDP map 
shape file are all in congruence with the numbering of the community areas, which 
allows for convenient compilation of data sets for the purposes of spatial data 
analysis. 
There are a number of indicators of population attributes that are extracted 
from data published by the United States Census Bureau, namely the 2000 Census and 
the 2010 Census, with supplemental data from the American Community Survey for 
the years 2008-2012, 2009-2013, and 2010-2014. As the Census tracts do not match 
the Chicago community areas with complete accuracy, the conversion process has 
been done by the Chicago Police Department and Rob Paral and associates 
(http://www.robparal.com/ChicagoCommunityAreaData.html). 
Due to the data having gaps between the years 2000 and 2010, as well as 
between 2010 and 2012, and finally the years after 2014, it is necessary to apply some 
interpolation and extrapolation methods to estimate data for the missing years. The 
methods for these tasks are outlined in Swanson and Tayman (2012) and they are 
based on estimating populations with the help of growth rates, through the use of 
exponential approaches. 
The population numbers for the years between 2000 and 2010 are estimated 
with the share-of-growth method described in Swanson and Tayman (2012, 130-131). 
The formula used in the interpolation is e^(ln(pop2000)+n/10*(ln(pop2010)-
ln(pop2000))) where n is the number of temporal steps out of the total 10 steps 
between the years 2000 and 2010. For example for the year 2004, n would be 4, 
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making the formula e^(ln(pop2000)+4/10*(ln(pop2010)-ln(pop2000))). This provides 
an estimate of populations in the years between that is based on an exponential growth 
rate instead of a simple linear interpolation, and the data more closely reflects the 
unknown reality of the population. 
For the final years in the data, 2015 and 2016, population estimates are 
calculated by an exponential extrapolation method in Swanson and Tayman (2012, 
118-119). The formula for extrapolating the missing data is pop2014*e^rz where r is 
(ln(pop2014/pop2010))/4 with 4 being the number of temporal steps between 2010 
and 2014, and z being the number of temporal steps after the final known data point. 
With only two years to extrapolate, r is either 1 for the years 2015 or 2 for the year 
2016. Again, this application of an exponential growth rate allows for estimations that 
are closer to the unknown reality than simple linear extrapolations would produce. 
Naturally, the numbers produced by these methods are merely estimates, but 
they are the best method available for estimating missing data between two data 
points, or for the data points following the last year in the known data set. There is the 
possibility that unforeseen events have caused unexpectedly radical changes in 
populations, but these estimates based on growth-rates are the closest that are possible 
based on the known data (Swanson and Tedrow, 1984). For example, natural disasters 
could cause an unexpected and massive drop in an area's population, but it is possible 
to return to the data and adjust the numbers to reflect reality if such new information 
comes to light. For the time being, these estimates are the closest to real data with 
what is known at the moment. 
All of the data are compiled into a GeoDa project file where each variable is 
encoded into the shapefile, assigning each data point to its corresponding spatial data 
point. As the shapefile and the data are all divided into space and data for each 
community area respectively, combining them provides a way to view the spatial 
distribution for each variable. There are a total of 77 community areas in the city of 
Chicago, all of which are assigned a number, and these numbers are the same across 
the various data sets and spatial data files provided by the City of Chicago and the 
Chicago Police Department. 
The combination is done by linking the community area numbers that are 
present both in the shapefile as well as the data files. For example, one area of interest 
in the analysis of housing projects is the community area of Grand Boulevard, which 
is encoded with the number 38 both in the shapefile and all the corresponding data 
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files on population and crime statistics. 
The resulting project file contains data divided into spatial units as well as 
temporal units, which grants the possibility of observing spatial distributions of 
variables in space as well as over time. The GeoDa software allows for analysis that 
considers differential spatial autocorrelation in data on a temporal level, meaning the 
possibility of discovering spatial clustering of change in the data between two points 
in time. 
There are some important variables taken into consideration in the analysis of 
Chicago’s homicide rates, one of which is poverty. E. Britt Patterson explains that his 
findings in an analysis of data in 57 communities “lends support to the thesis that 
severe conditions of material disadvantage (absolute poverty) raise levels of 
community violence by eroding a community’s capacity for social control and self-
regulation” (1991, 769). This finding is in agreement with the literature discussed 
earlier in this thesis where the lack of collective efficacy was seen as one contributing 
factor to the problems in housing projects. Furthermore, Patterson notes that “the data 
show that violence is more prevalent in social areas characterized by greater levels of 
absolute poverty and that this association is independent of several other attributes of 
the areas” (1991, 769-770). 
Another variable that is considered in the spatio-temporal analysis is the 
percentage of housing in an area that is owner occupied. This is used as a proxy 
indicator of the presence of public housing projects, as Chicago’s housing projects 
were concentrated in particular community areas, where one would expect to see low 
percentages of housing owned by the people occupying them. If this expectation is 
true, it should be possible to notice some indication of changes in housing types in the 
community areas. If thousands of units of public housing residences are removed from 
an area, there should be a relative increase in the percentage of owner occupied 
housing. 
From demographic and socioeconomic factors, the analysis considers some 
indicators of educational attainment as well as the ethnic breakdown of the 
community area populations. For the educational attainment, the data includes 
percentages of people without high school diplomas, people with only a high school 
diploma, as well as people with some college education, and finally people with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher. The ethnic breakdown divides people into percentages of 
people of Asian, black, Hispanic, white, or other ethnicities. 
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In addition to the statistical data, the Encyclopedia of Chicago and various 
newspaper sources have been used to ascertain the locations of the city’s largest 
housing projects as well as the years during which they were ultimately demolished. 
Two such community areas present in the data are Douglas and Grand Boulevard, 
which were concentrations of some of the largest housing projects in the city, 
including the Robert Taylor Homes. Unfortunately, due to the limitations of the data, 
the effects of the demolition of the Cabrini-Green Homes in Near North Side cannot 
be captured, as the data begins in the year 2000, and the demolition of Cabrini-Green 
had begun already in 1995. 
  
6 Findings and Analysis 
 
This section of the thesis will cover the results produced in the analyses, and there 
will be additional discussion on the interpretation of the results. However, this will not 
be done in separate subsections, but rather with the findings and analysis discussion 
flowing from one to the other. The first topic of discussion will be the findings of the 
spatiotemporal tests and their accompanying analysis. The second topic discussed will 
be the findings from a linear regression model with fixed effects and the results are 
also analyzed. Finally, the last part of this section presents results from a 
complementary spatial data analysis that examines the connections between a number 
of detrimental socioeconomic factors and homicide rates, and the subsection contains 
both the findings and analysis. 
  
6.1 Spatiotemporal 
 
In order to help the reader follow the results and analysis of the spatiotemporal 
analysis, below is a map of all of Chicago’s 77 community areas, numbered and 
named (Figure 4). As the results images produced by the GeoDa software are 
unlabeled, utilizing this map will allow the reader to orient themselves on the map. 
When discussing the results as they pertain to specific community areas, the reference 
number of the community area will be added to each mention of that area for easier 
map checking, in the following manner: Hyde Park [41], Norwood Park [10], Garfield 
Ridge [56], and so on. 
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Figure 4 
 
The following maps present the findings of a differential local Moran’s I 
analysis where the starting point was defined as the year 2000 and the ending point as 
the year 2008. The policy of demolition of high-rise public housing was already in full 
effect in the year 2000, with the community areas of Douglas [35] and Grand 
Boulevard [38] being the locations where the majority of the demolition was 
occurring, with a miles long stretch along State Street comprising of large housing 
projects. This concentration of public housing was known as the State Street Corridor. 
One of the city’s largest housing projects, the Robert Taylor Homes, was in the 
community area of Grand Boulevard [38] and its demolition was finished during 
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2007. Along with Cabrini-Green Homes, the Robert Taylor Homes were possibly the 
most notorious housing projects in terms of gang presence and violence, as described 
by Venkatesh (2009). 
In order to capture the possible lagged effects of residents moving away from 
the community area of Grand Boulevard, I have chosen the year 2008 as the end point 
for a differential local Moran’s I analysis. The demolition was still ongoing in 2007, 
so it is preferable to choose 2008 as that is the first complete year following the 
finished process of demolition, and it should capture any immediate effects of the 
demolition as the displaced residents would find new housing units during the year of 
2007, or 2008 at the latest. Interestingly enough, the findings indicate that there were 
indeed changes in a number of variables following the completion of the Robert 
Taylor Homes demolition. 
 
6.1.1 Homicide rates 
 
This subsection focuses on the changes in homicide rates in the city of Chicago, with 
descriptions of what findings were produced by the tests and discussion on how to 
interpret these results. The first image displays the clustering of change in homicide 
rates between the years 2000 and 2008 (Figure 5). There are five different colors 
indicated in the map image, with the legend provided by the GeoDa software in the 
upper left corner. 
The majority of the map is colored light gray, which means there is no 
statistically significant clustering of any kind when compared to an artificial null 
hypothesis produced by running Monte Carlo permutations on the data. In these 
images the number of permutations has been set to 999. The weights matrix used in 
the analysis is a queen contiguity, meaning that all contiguous neighbors on all sides 
of an area are weighted in the local Moran’s I analysis. 
The four other colors in the map indicate that some type of clustering is 
present in the area. Areas colored red indicate places where high values of homicide 
rates are surrounded by similar high values. Areas colored blue are areas where there 
is clustering of low values surrounded by similar low values. The remaining cases 
contain clustering of dissimilar values, where light purple areas are low values of 
homicide rates surrounded by high values, and light red areas are high values of 
homicide rates surrounded by low values. 
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In the differential local Moran’s I, the values are interpreted somewhat 
differently. Whereas in a local Moran’s I statistic low and high values are interpreted 
in a straight forward manner, where a high value corresponds to a high value in the 
data, in a differential local Moran’s I the values are determined by examining the 
changes between the starting point and the ending point. A low value in this analysis 
means a decrease in the values between the starting point and the ending point, 
namely that the starting point value is higher than the ending point value. Conversely, 
a high value means an increase in the value between the two points in time, with the 
ending point value being larger than the starting point value. 
 
 
Figure 5 
 
 As the map shows, there are four areas where there is clustering of high values 
surrounded by high values, six areas where there is clustering of low values 
surrounded by low values, four areas of lows surrounded by highs, and two of highs 
surrounded by lows.  
 What is interesting to note is where the clustering of values occurs. The 
clustering of decrease in homicide rates is located in and around the area where the 
Robert Taylor Homes and a large number of other housing projects were demolished 
during that time period, namely the community areas of Grand Boulevard [38] and 
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Douglas [35]. The immediate surrounding community areas of Armour Square [34], 
Oakland [36], and Fuller Park [37] also show clustering of decreases in homicide rates 
following the demolition of public housing. 
 However, there are also areas where homicide rates have gone up between the 
years 2000 and 2008. This is of particular interest as there was an overall trend of 
decreasing homicide rates in the city following the dwindling crack cocaine boom, 
starting around the year 2000, with the actual numbers of homicides decreasing from 
582 in 2000 (CPD annual report 1999/2000) to 510 in 2008 (CPD annual report 
2008). In spite of this 12% decrease in homicide, there are areas where homicide rates 
have gone up from 2000 to 2008. Of course, it is impossible to claim direct causality 
based on the indications displayed in the results of the analysis, but they are 
interesting anomalies nonetheless. 
 There are two community areas on the edges of the concentration of 
decreasing homicide rates where homicide rates have increased, namely Near South 
Side [33] and Bridgeport [60]. These are immediately adjacent to the areas where 
massive demolitions of public housing occurred, which is interesting to note even if 
concrete verification of causality or connection cannot be made with the data that is 
available. There are also some areas in the southern parts of the city where homicide 
rates have gone up. 
The following image is a significance map for the differential local Moran’s I 
statistic between the years 2000 and 2008 in terms of changes in homicide rates 
(Figure 6). As was described earlier, the statistical significance is calculated based on 
a pseudo null hypothesis that is constructed by running Monte Carlo permutations on 
the existing data, and for the purposes of these analyses the number of permutations 
has been set at 999. Naturally, the significance map corresponds to the earlier cluster 
map, where only statistically significant clustering is displayed. 
In the same way as the cluster map for the differential local Moran’s I, the 
significance levels are encoded on the map with the use of colors. In this particular 
map, the majority of the community areas are colored gray, which translates to no 
statistical significance at the set levels. The areas with the standard p-level of 0.05 are 
colored a light green. Areas with a p-level of 0.01 are indicated by a medium green 
color, and highly significant areas with a p-level of 0.001 are colored a dark green. 
 As the map shows, there are 8 areas that are statistically significant at p-level 
0.05, 4 areas that are significant at p-level 0.01, and also 4 areas that are significant at 
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p-level 0.001. The areas with the lowest p-level of 0.001, or the highest statistical 
significance are, from top left to bottom right, Bridgeport [60], Armour Square [34], 
Chatham [44], and Avalon Park [45]. Of these, Bridgeport [60], Chatham [44], and 
Avalon Park [45] saw increases in homicide rates between 2000 and 2008, and 
Armour Square [34] experienced a decrease during this period. 
 
 
Figure 6 
 
 The community areas of most interest in terms of public housing, Douglas (35) 
and Grand Boulevard [38] were statistically significant at p-levels 0.05 and 0.01 
respectively. The strength of the significance is especially noteworthy for Grand 
Boulevard [38], where the notorious Robert Taylor Homes high-rise housing projects 
had been demolished during this period. In the surrounding community areas with 
decreases in homicide rates, there were two highly significant ones. Armour Square 
[34] had a decrease in homicides that was significant at p-level 0.001 and Fuller Park 
had a decrease significant at p-level 0.01. 
 Again, making definitive claims of causality with the available data is not 
possible, but it is worth noting the strongest statistical significances in and around the 
area where the concentration of high-rise housing projects was. Of these, Fuller Park 
[37] and Grand Boulevard [38] were significant at a p-level of 0.01 and both areas 
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experienced decreases in homicide rates between 2000 and 2008. Another two areas, 
Armour Square [34] and Bridgeport [60], had extremely high statistical significance at 
p-level 0.001, with the first one experiencing a decrease and the latter one 
experiencing an increase in homicide rates. 
 
6.1.2 Owner Occupied 
 
This subsection focuses on changes in the percent of owner occupied housing in 
Chicago. The justification for the notability of this variable was outlined earlier, but as 
a short reiteration, the percentage of owner occupied housing has the potential to 
reveal areas where there are concentrations of public housing residents, as they would 
not be the owners of their residences. In terms of change, this variable can act as a 
proxy indicator of where public housing residents move to after the demolition of the 
largest high-rise housing projects. 
 The first map illustrates the results of a differential local Moran’s I analysis on 
the variable of percentage of owner occupied housing between the years 2000 and 
2008 (Figure 7). Here, there are more clusters of change to be found than in the 
previous maps on homicide rates. Only slightly more than half of the map, 42 
community areas out of 77, do not contain statistically significant clustering of 
change. 
 There are 15 areas where clusters of high values surrounded by high values, or 
in this differential context clustering of increases in values, occur and those areas are 
again marked on the map with red. Conversely, there are 18 clustered areas where 
decreasing values are surrounded by decreasing values and these areas are marked on 
the map with blue. Finally, there are two areas where decreasing values are 
surrounded by increasing values and these areas are marked on the map with a light 
purple color. 
It is possible to discern four major concentrations where the changes in the 
percentage of owner occupied housing occurs. There are two sections of the city 
where the clustering of decreasing percentages in owner occupied housing are present. 
One is on the western edge of the city and consists of Montclare [18], Belmont Cragin 
[19], and Austin [25], the last of which is one of the largest majority black community 
areas in the city. Most of the city’s southern portion has also gone through decreases 
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in the percentage of owner occupied housing, with Washington Heights [73] being an 
island of no statistically significant clustering in the middle. 
 Again, the area of most interest lies in the area where the public housing 
projects have been demolished. There is a concentration of clustering of owner 
occupied percentage increases around the area where the Robert Taylor Homes and 
other large housing projects were demolished. Armour Square [34], Douglas [35], 
Oakland [36], Grand Boulevard [38], Kenwood [39], and Hyde Park [41] all have 
clustering of increased percentages in owner occupied housing, and all are either the 
sites of the housing project demolition or in their immediate vicinity. 
 
 
Figure 7 
 
Only Fuller Park [37] right next to the area where the Robert Taylor Homes 
stood has experienced a decrease in the percentage of owner occupied housing during 
this period. Some distance to the north, the community area of Near North Side [8] 
has also experienced an increase in the percentage of owner occupied housing. This is 
noteworthy due to the fact that this particular community area was the location of the 
Cabrini-Green housing projects, which were demolished between the years 1995 and 
2011. It is feasible that the process is captured in this analysis, as the number of rented 
residences was decreasing during the period. 
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 Without access to data on the movement of individuals, it is difficult to claim 
anything concrete, but the results indicate a large-scale shift in the ownership patterns 
in housing that has occurred in different parts of the city. It is possible that this 
variable has captured, at least partially, the movement of the population displaced 
from the demolished housing projects. If this is the case, it would indicate populations 
moving down to the southern areas of the city, or toward Austin [25] and the 
surrounding neighborhoods. 
 The concentration of percentage increase clustering in the northeastern part of 
the city may be an indicator of something unrelated to the subject of this thesis, but it 
is interesting nonetheless. These community areas are more of the affluent type than 
those in the south, or those around the State Street Corridor. There was a housing 
bubble in the US that reached its peak during the period under examination here, and 
it is possible, if not likely, that the data has captured some part of the housing bubble’s 
effects. This also presents another possibility of explaining the decreases in ownership 
in other areas of the city, where people may have been losing ownership of their 
houses through foreclosures, but this trend only became prevalent after the financial 
crisis of 2007-2008. 
The following image is a significance map for the differential local Moran’s I 
statistic between the years 2000 and 2008 in terms of changes the percentage of owner 
occupied housing (Figure 8). As before, the different degrees of statistical significance 
and the accompanying p-levels are displayed on the map with different shades of 
green. Light green areas have a p-level of 0.05, medium green areas have a p-level of 
0.01, and the dark green areas have a p-level of 0.001. Also as before, the 
significances are based on the pseudo null constructed by 999 Monte Carlo 
permutations. In correspondence with the previous cluster map of the same variable, 
areas that are light gray in color are areas where no statistically significant clustering 
occurs. 
 There are two community areas with the highest statistical significance and a 
p-level of 0.001, and both are in clusters of increases surrounded by increases. The 
two community areas are those of Lincoln Park [7] in the northeast and Douglas [35] 
in the area of the State Street Corridor. The high statistical significance is no surprise, 
knowing the number of public housing units that had been removed during the period 
under consideration. 
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Figure 8 
 
 Also in and around the State Street Corridor area there are three community 
areas that are highly significant at a p-level of 0.01, namely Armour Square [34], 
Grand Boulevard [38], and Kenwood [39]. All saw increases in the percentage of 
owner occupied housing during the period. Around the area are also three other 
community areas with statistical significance at a p-level of 0.05, those being Fuller 
Park [37], Oakland [36], and Hyde Park [41]. The latter two experienced increases in 
the percentage of owner occupied housing. The interesting outlier, and a somewhat 
unexpected result is Fuller Park [37] experiencing a decrease in the percentage of 
owner occupied housing, as it goes against the overall trend in this concentration of 
community areas formerly containing or being adjacent to massive public housing 
projects. 
 
6.1.3 Poverty 
 
This subsection focuses on changes in the percent of people living below the poverty 
line in Chicago. The connection between violent crime and poverty was discussed 
earlier, where the literature showed that the two are highly correlated. The first image 
shows the results of a differential local Moran’s I analysis on the percentage of people 
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living in poverty between 2000 and 2008 (Figure 9). There are not as many areas with 
significant clustering as there were in the map of the percentage of owner occupied 
housing, but there are apparent similarities to where the concentrations of clustering 
are when comparing this map to the map on owner occupied housing and the one on 
homicide rates. 
 A majority of the map is colored gray which denotes no statistically significant 
clustering, in this case 53 community areas fall under this category. There are 10 areas 
where increases in the value of the variable are surrounded by similar increases, and 
these areas are marked red in the cluster map. There are 8 community areas where 
decreases in the value are surrounded by similar decreases, with these areas being 
marked blue on the cluster map. Three areas of decreases surrounded by increases are 
marked on the map with a light purple color. Finally, there are three areas where 
increases are surrounded by decreases, and these are marked light red on the cluster 
map. 
 
 
Figure 9 
 
 Once more, there is a concentrated area where decreasing percentages of 
people in poverty are discovered in the analysis for the time period from 2000 to 
2008, and again it is centered in the area where large public housing projects have 
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been demolished, and the areas surrounding it. Starting from the southeastern point, 
the community areas of Kenwood [39], Grand Boulevard [38], Oakland [36], Douglas 
[35], and Near South Side [33] all show clustered decreasing percentages of poverty 
during the period. At the northernmost point of the concentration of decreasing values, 
the community area of Near North Side [8] may again be displaying the effects of the 
demolition of the Cabrini-Green Homes. 
 Conversely, on the western side and to the southeast of the State Street 
Corridor, some community areas in the immediate vicinity show changes toward the 
other direction. Armour Square [34], Fuller Park [37], and Hyde Park [41] all show 
clustering of increasing values of poverty even though most of the adjacent areas are 
showing decreasing values. Considering how the poorest section of the population 
most likely does not have many resources to spend in moving to a new location, it is 
probable that they would instead choose areas closest to ones where they previously 
resided. 
 The southern areas of the city show a large mass of clustering of increasing 
values in the poverty percentage. Gage Park [63] and Chicago Lawn [66] are 
somewhat of an island to the northwest of the main concentration, and in the mass of 
increases in poverty, two notable examples are the community areas of Auburn 
Gresham [71] and Avalon Park [45]. The presence of Hegewisch [55] in the very 
farthest southeastern point on the map is interesting in that the community area has 
not been present in the analyses done on other variables. 
 Also of interest are the areas in the middle of the concentration of poverty 
increase clusters that have experienced decreases in poverty in spite of all the 
surrounding areas becoming more affected by poverty. These community areas are 
Calumet Heights [48], Pullman [50], and Riverdale [54]. 
 The final map image is the significance map accompanying the cluster map for 
the differential local Moran’s I statistic between the years 2000 and 2008 in terms of 
changes the percentage of people living below the poverty line (Figure 10). Once 
more, the different p-levels are represented by different shades of green on the map, 
with p-level 0.05 being light green, p-level 0.01 a medium green, and p-level 0.001 a 
dark green. The community areas with a gray color do not have any statistically 
significant clustering in them. 
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Figure 10 
 
 There are four community areas with the highest statistical significance of p-
level 0.001, namely Loop [32], Armour Square [34], Douglas [35], and Calumet 
Heights [48]. Apart from Armour Square [34], which saw an increase in poverty, all of 
the other three areas showed clustering of decreasing poverty percentage values. 
 Six areas also have high statistical significance at p-level 0.01. These 
community areas are those of Oakland [36], Kenwood [39], Hyde Park [41], Chatham 
[44], Roseland [49], and Pullman [50]. Of these six, three areas experienced decreases 
in the percentage of poverty and conversely, three experienced increases. The 
community areas with decreases in poverty were Oakland [36], Kenwood [39], and 
Pullman [50], and the ones with increases in poverty were Hyde Park [41], Chatham 
[44], and Roseland [49]. All of the remaining statistically significant community areas 
were significant at a p-level of 0.05. 
 
6.1.4 Summary of spatiotemporal analysis 
 
There are some patterns to be found when looking at a combination of all the analyses 
that were discussed previously. While the variable of most interest is homicide rates, 
combining the effects on the homicide rate variable with effects on the other two 
54 
 
 
variables produces indications of effects on the quality of life in a number of 
community areas following the demolition of the city’s largest high-rise housing 
projects. 
 
Area No Community Area Homicide Rate Owner 
Occupied 
Poverty 
8 Near North Side  High-High * Low-Low * 
35 Douglas Low-Low * High-High *** Low-Low *** 
36 Oakland Low-Low * High-High * Low-Low ** 
38 Grand Boulevard Low-Low ** High-High ** Low-Low * 
50 Pullman Low-High * Low-Low ** Low-High ** 
     
33 Near South Side High-Low *  Low-Low * 
43 South Shore High-High **   
45 Avalon Park High-High ***  High-High * 
48 Calumet Heights High-High *** Low-Low ** Low-High *** 
60 Bridgeport High-Low ***   
71 Auburn Gresham High-High * Low-Low ** High-High * 
     
Sig. * 0.05 | ** 0.01 | *** 0.001    
 
The table displays a collection of the most prominent examples of the patterns of 
change, with the positive examples displayed on the top five rows and the negative 
examples on the remaining bottom rows. The variables are noted by the differential 
local Moran’s I statistic results for them between the years 2000 and 2008, with the 
notation reporting the type of clustering for the variable in a given community area, 
for example “low-low” means a cluster of low values surrounded by low values, or in 
the differential case decreases surrounded by decreases, and “low-high” means lows 
or decreases surrounded by highs or increases, and so on. 
 Most of the positive cases include decreases in homicide rates accompanied by 
increases in the percentage of owner occupied housing and decreases in the 
percentage of people living below the poverty line. The negative cases included were 
chosen mainly due to the highly significant increases in homicide rates, which is the 
variable of main interest. In some cases increases in homicide rates were accompanied 
by decreases in the percentage of owner occupied housing and increases in the 
percentage of people in poverty. 
 The overall effects following the demolition of the massive high-rise housing 
projects appear to be such that the situation was improved in and around the 
immediate area where those projects stood, but a number of community areas in the 
southern parts of the city took a turn for the worse, especially in terms of homicide 
rates. As was mentioned earlier, there was an overall decrease in homicides in the city 
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during the period, and for that reason increases in homicide rates in some community 
areas is even more troubling. 
 
6.2 Linear regression with fixed effects 
 
For the purposes of this analysis, the data was compiled into panel form, which 
separated all the variables under consideration by community areas and by year. 
Furthermore, the status of a community area’s high-rise housing projects were 
converted into a categorical dummy variable, where 0 indicates no presence of high-
rise public housing, 1 indicates high-rise public housing that is currently lived in, 2 
indicates high-rise public housing that is currently condemned or in the process of 
demolition, and 3 indicates areas where the demolition of high-rise public housing has 
been completed. The inclusion of the value of 2 is warranted, as the demolition 
process takes a substantial length of time, the longest example being the Cabrini-
Green Homes where the demolition process began in 1995 and ended in 2011. 
 With panel data covering the years from 2000 to 2016 for variables that vary 
over time, and which can be divided into observations on individual community areas 
as well as dummy variables dividing observation into different categories, a linear 
regression model that controls for fixed effects is a proper approach to observe 
variations within and between the various categories (Paul D. Allison, 2009). The 
variables used in the regressions are as follows: 
 
Dependent variable:  
Homicide rate (homiciderate) 
Independent variables: 
Log of population (logpop) 
% of population – Asian (pctasian) 
% of population – black (pctblack) 
% of population – Hispanic (pcthispanic) 
% of population – other (pctother) 
% of population below poverty level (pctpoverty) 
% of housing occupied by owner (pctownerocc) 
% of population without high school diploma (pctnohsd) 
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% of population with only high school diploma (pcthsd) 
% of population with some college studies (pctcollege) 
 
 
6.2.1 No fixed effects 
 
The first regression was run without controlling for any fixed effects, with the public 
housing categorical dummy included among the independent variables. Presented here 
is a truncated version of the regression results, the complete Stata outputs can be 
found in the appendices. The same applies for all variations when different fixed 
effects are controlled for on the following pages, where truncated results are presented 
in the text and the complete tables are located in the appendices. 
 
homiciderate Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|      
pubhousing -1,067406 0,8076334 -1,32 0,187 
logpop 1,927535 1,585337 1,22 0,224 
pctasian -0,3869041 0,0640607 -6,04 0,000 
pctblack 0,3009993 0,034576 8,71 0,000 
pcthispanic -0,1682697 0,0414527 -4,06 0,000 
pctother -0,0239857 0,6895816 -0,03 0,972 
pctpoverty 0,505394 0,0968547 5,22 0,000 
pctownerocc 0,0017847 0,0482926 0,04 0,971 
pctnohsd 0,0737428 0,0820822 0,90 0,369 
pcthsd 0,8207175 0,0986925 8,32 0,000 
pctcollege -0,9115294 0,1377842 -6,62 0,000 
_cons -3,993771 9,260696 -0,43 0,666 
 
 The results of the regression show indications that some demographic factors 
have a statistically significant effect on the homicide rate, with Asian and Hispanic 
having a negative coefficient while black has a positive one. Also, the percentage of 
people in poverty has a notable effect on the homicide rate, and it is also highly 
statistically significant. Educational factors also have a statistically significant effect 
on the homicide rate, with no high school diploma and only a high school diploma 
have a positive coefficient, while college has a negative coefficient. The adjusted R-
squared for this test is 0.5866. However, as these results go through notable changes 
as various fixed effects are controlled for, they will not be discussed in more detail at 
this point. 
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6.2.2 Fixed effects – public housing 
 
The first step in controlling for fixed effects is the addition of the categorical dummy 
variable of public housing. To reiterate, the categories in the variable are: 0 for no 
high-rise housing, 1 for high-rise housing in use, 2 for high-rise housing in the process 
of demolition, and 3 for high-rise housing where demolition has been finished. 
 
homiciderate Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|      
pubhousing 
    
1 3,439348 5,167882 0,67 0,506 
2 -2,633058 2,731618 -0,96 0,335 
3 -3,124514 2,819188 -1,11 0,268      
logpop 2,091819 1,59738 1,31 0,191 
pctasian -0,3857288 0,0642359 -6,00 0,000 
pctblack 0,3006231 0,0347369 8,65 0,000 
pcthispanic -0,1680579 0,0418194 -4,02 0,000 
pctother -0,0440973 0,6923825 -0,06 0,949 
pctpoverty 0,502293 0,0971115 5,17 0,000 
pctownerocc -0,0009386 0,0484225 -0,02 0,985 
pctnohsd 0,0718783 0,0824829 0,87 0,384 
pcthsd 0,8289907 0,0997891 8,31 0,000 
pctcollege -0,9067786 0,1379481 -6,57 0,000 
_cons -4,797133 9,307663 -0,52 0,606 
 
 With this addition, there are not many notable changes in the results. Some of 
the coefficients change slightly both up and down, but no major alterations become 
apparent when the public housing variable is controlled for, except for the no high 
school diploma losing statistical significance. At this point, the different categories in 
the public housing variable are all not statistically significant. The adjusted R-squared 
for this version of the test is 0.5862, marginally worse than the simple regression 
performed at the beginning. 
 
6.2.3 Fixed effects – public housing, year 
 
Adding a control for the year in addition to the variable on public housing produces 
the following results. The year-by-year coefficients and p-values can be found in the 
appendices, as the table would become too lengthy to include in the text.  
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homiciderate Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|      
pubhousing 
    
1 5,361189 5,073736 1,06 0,291 
2 -0,3784674 2,727847 -0,14 0,890 
3 -4,155314 2,761962 -1,50 0,133      
logpop 1,482291 1,569415 0,94 0,345 
pctasian -0,4769785 0,0679379 -7,02 0,000 
pctblack 0,2824532 0,0340957 8,28 0,000 
pcthispanic -0,2983607 0,0528628 -5,64 0,000 
pctother 0,2849758 0,6975592 0,41 0,683 
pctpoverty 0,2939613 0,1092771 2,69 0,007 
pctownerocc -0,0270927 0,0477337 -0,57 0,570 
pctnohsd 0,4338896 0,1219022 3,56 0,000 
pcthsd 0,7274708 0,0989587 7,35 0,000 
pctcollege -0,8598039 0,1348108 -6,38 0,000 
_cons -3,735569 9,235028 -0,40 0,686 
 
 Again, there are no major shifts in the results when controlling for year in the 
regression. The p-values for the public housing variable shift closer to statistical 
significance, except for the “in process” value of 2, which leaps far away from it. The 
population characteristics remain highly significant in this iteration, as well as the 
variable on poverty and the ones for educational attainment. The “no high school 
diploma” variable regains its statistical significance. The adjusted R-squared for this 
regression is 0.6063, which is higher than the previous two regressions. 
 
6.2.4 Fixed effects – public housing, community area 
 
In this iteration of the regression, the fixed effects variables that are controlled for are 
public housing and community area. Again, the bulk of the table and the 
accompanying outputs are located in the appendices, as including all 77 community 
areas in the table would produce an unwieldy inclusion within the text proper. 
 
homiciderate Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|      
pubhousing 
    
1 33,1871 17,64672 1,88 0,060 
2 29,26884 14,02624 2,09 0,037 
3 24,74888 13,02659 1,90 0,058      
logpop -29,06 17,41719 -1,67 0,095 
pctasian 0,0308025 0,4479231 0,07 0,945 
pctblack -0,1539104 0,2980601 -0,52 0,606 
pcthispanic -0,014614 0,1336585 -0,11 0,913 
pctother 0,5010452 0,9787869 0,51 0,609 
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pctpoverty -0,1980966 0,1859895 -1,07 0,287 
pctownerocc -0,901327 0,2215887 -4,07 0,000 
pctnohsd 0,0330712 0,172537 0,19 0,848 
pcthsd 0,7186223 0,2527457 2,84 0,005 
pctcollege 0,2171052 0,3269153 0,66 0,507 
_cons 158,7321 80,25033 1,98 0,048 
 
 Controlling for the community area produces massive changes in the results of 
the regression. The demographic factors containing the percentages of various 
population types all completely lose their statistical significance, and their coefficients 
have gone through changes as well. Having only a high school diploma retains its 
statistical significance with a positive coefficient, whereas having no high school 
diploma or some college education both lose their statistical significance. The 
percentage of people in poverty also loses its statistical significance in the regression, 
and its positive coefficient has become a negative one. 
 Perhaps the most interesting changes in the results brought forth by the control 
for community areas pertain to housing types and ownership. The percentage of 
owner occupied housing has become highly significant with a negative coefficient. 
According to this regression, the higher the percentage of people living in housing 
that they own, the lower the homicide rate is generally. Also, with this added control 
variable, the presence of high-rise housing becomes very close to statistical 
significance, or passes the threshold in the case of its ‘2’ value. All of the values for 
the high-rise project variable have high coefficients in terms of homicide rates. The 
adjusted R-squared value for this regression is 0.6641, notably higher than all the 
previous regressions. 
 
6.2.5 Fixed effects – public housing, community area, year 
 
The final regression includes all the fixed effects controls, meaning public housing, 
community area, and year. Once again the inclusion of year and community area 
makes the results tables quite lengthy, and thus a truncated version without the 
community area and year portions are presented here, with the complete versions in 
the appendices. 
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homiciderate Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|      
pubhousing 
    
1 47,56625 17,79019 2,67 0,008 
2 45,27854 14,4159 3,14 0,002 
3 38,8968 13,45388 2,89 0,004      
logpop -32,81856 17,73013 -1,85 0,064 
pctasian -0,1838188 0,45175 -0,41 0,684 
pctblack -0,2045532 0,2908936 -0,70 0,482 
pcthispanic -0,0849017 0,1462269 -0,58 0,562 
pctother -0,0590287 0,9645166 -0,06 0,951 
pctpoverty -0,3759569 0,2066277 -1,82 0,069 
pctownerocc -0,4696189 0,2309043 -2,03 0,042 
pctnohsd 0,6335945 0,3015511 2,10 0,036 
pcthsd 0,9053425 0,2806724 3,23 0,001 
pctcollege 0,6777234 0,350016 1,94 0,053 
_cons 136,2558 84,93435 1,60 0,109 
 
 With the inclusion of all the fixed effects controls, the results become altered 
in quite an interesting fashion. Whereas the simple linear regression estimated that all 
the major population characteristics were statistically significant, including all the 
fixed effects controls removes all statistical significance from the population 
characteristics. The percentage of people in poverty has also lost its significance, but 
not by much, and interestingly its coefficient is now negative whereas it was positive 
in the regressions that did not account for the community area effects. 
 The variables pertaining to educational attainment are once again statistically 
significant, with some college education being just above the p-level threshold. The 
coefficients for all three educational variables are positive, which is somewhat 
perplexing in terms of the one on college education. It is also interesting to note that 
the log of the populations in the community areas is also close to statistical 
significance. 
 Controlling for the year in addition to the community areas has caused the p-
value for owner occupied housing to rise somewhat, but the variable is still 
statistically significant. While the magnitude of the coefficient is somewhat 
diminished, a higher percentage of owner occupied housing is still negatively 
correlated with homicide rates. As was discussed earlier, this variable may be a 
somewhat noisy proxy variable for the presence of public housing. 
 The most noteworthy changes in the results are in terms of the variable 
pertaining to the presence of high-rise public housing projects. While the variable 
started without significance in the original linear regression, including the control for 
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community areas brought it close to statistical significance, and now including a 
control for both the year and the community areas has resulted in all three categories 
of the variable having very strong statistical significance. 
 What is also very apparent is the magnitude of the coefficients for the presence 
of high-rise public housing. The presence of high-rise housing projects or demolished 
high-rise housing projects has a notable increasing effect on homicide rates. It is 
interesting to note the differences in the coefficient values for the categories. With 1, 
where the high-rise projects are in full use, the coefficient is higher than with 2, where 
the high-rise projects are in the process of demolition, and this is in turn higher than 
with the value 3, where the demolition is completed. This would indicate that areas 
going through the process of demolition and finishing it leads to a reduction in 
homicide rates. The adjusted R-squared for this regression was 0.6826, the highest 
value produced in any of the regressions. On a final note, the fixed effects control for 
the year indicated that the years 2015 and 2016 had higher homicide rates, and the 
coefficients for both years were statistically significant. 
 
6.2.6 Fixed effects summary 
 
Overall, controlling for the various fixed effects helped tease out the significance of 
variables that would have been ignored in a straight forward linear regression. 
Especially the inclusion of the community area control helped estimate the 
coefficients of the chosen independent variables with more accuracy, as there are 
notable differences in homicide rates between the different community areas. 
 Below is a table presenting the results produced by the different regressions 
run on the data set, with comparisons of the coefficients, their significances and the R-
squared and adjusted R-squared values for each of the regressions: 
 
Variable OLS OLS + pubhous OLS + 
pubhous + 
year 
OLS + 
pubhous + 
commarea 
OLS + 
pubhous + 
commarea + 
year 
logpop 1,927535 2,091819 1,482291 -29,06 -32,81856 
pctasian -0,3869041 *** -0,3857288 *** -0,4769785 *** 0,0308025 -0,1838188 
pctblack 0,3009993 *** 0,3006231 *** 0,2824532 *** -0,1539104 -0,2045532 
pcthispanic -0,1682697 *** -0,1680579 *** -0,2983607 *** -0,014614 -0,0849017 
pctother -0,0239857 -0,0440973 0,2849758 0,5010452 -0,0590287 
pctpoverty 0,505394 *** 0,502293 *** 0,2939613 ** -0,1980966 -0,3759569 
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pctownerocc 0,0017847 -0,0009386 -0,0270927 -0,901327 
*** 
-0,4696189 * 
pctnohsd 0,0737428 0,0718783 0,4338896 *** 0,0330712 0,6335945 * 
pcthsd 0,8207175 *** 0,8289907 *** 0,7274708 *** 0,7186223 
** 
0,9053425 ** 
pctcollege -0,9115294 *** -0,9067786 *** -0,8598039 *** 0,2171052 0,6777234 
pubhous1 
 
3,439348 5,361189 33,1871 47,56625 ** 
pubhous2 
 
-2,633058 -0,3784674 29,26884 * 45,27854 ** 
pubhous3 
 
-3,124514 -4,155314 24,74888 38,8968 ** 
      
R-squared 0.5901 0.5904 0.615 0.6867 0.7078 
Adj. R-
squared 
0.5866 0.5862 0.6063 0.6641 0.6826 
      
Sig. * 0.05 | ** 0.01 | *** 0.001 
   
 
 
6.3 Spatial Data Analysis 
 
As a supplementary analysis, this subchapter considers some detrimental health 
factors and other adverse socioeconomic and health indicators and how they are 
related to the homicide rate, and also whether or not there is some spatial dependence 
between the variables that may be missed by OLS regression models. 
 The variables in the analysis are compiled from datasets available at the 
Chicago Data Portal, and from those the following were selected for use: CrwdHous – 
the percentage of crowded housing units, DiabRel – diabetes related deaths per 
100,000, LoBirthWt – percentage of low birth weight live births, LungCanc – lung 
cancer deaths per 100,000, Tuberc – tuberculosis cases per 100,000, Unempl – 
percentage of people over 16 years old in the work force unemployed. OOcc2012 and 
Pov2012 are variables also examined in the spatiotemporal analysis chapter, being the 
percentage of owner occupied housing in 2012 and percentage of people living below 
the poverty line in 2012 respectively. 
 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-Statistic Probability 
     
CONSTANT -29.5146060 12.4608699 -2.3685831 0.0207042 
CrwdHous 0.9031612 0.6838020 1.3207933 0.1909981 
DiabRel -0.1645418 0.1278704 -1.2867857 0.2025324 
LoBirthWt 1.9601490 0.7233107 2.7099681 0.0085088 
LungCanc 0.4999914 0.1900838 2.6303732 0.0105405 
OOcc2012 -0.0248421 0.1530815 -0.1622800 0.8715666 
Pov2012 0.6755164 0.3632114 1.8598435 0.0672335 
Tuberc -0.1204474 0.4792192 -0.2513409 0.8023085 
Unempl -0.0374834 0.4752213 -0.0788757 0.9373632 
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 The OLS regression results show that there is statistically significant 
correlation between the homicide rate and the independent variables of low birth 
weight and lung cancer deaths, with poverty being close to statistical significance. 
The R-squared value for the regression is 0.6370, and the adjusted R-squared is 
0.5943. However, the diagnostics for spatial dependence suggest that the OLS 
regression is missing something in the data. 
 
DIAGNOSTICS FOR SPATIAL DEPENDENCE 
   
TEST MI/DF VALUE PROB 
  
Lagrange Multiplier (lag) 1 4.051 0.0441 
  
Robust LM (lag) 1 5.541 0.0186 
  
Lagrange Multiplier(error) 1 0.336 0.5619 
  
Robust LM (error) 1 1.826 0.1766 
  
Lagrange Multiplier 
(SARMA) 
2 5.877 0.0529 
  
 
 The diagnostics indicate that there is some spatial dependence present in the 
dataset, and further steps should be taken. Based on the diagnostics, the appropriate 
model to run is a spatial lag model, with a p-value of 0.0441. The results from the 
spatial lag model are below. The analysis was run with the same spatial weights file as 
before, where the neighbors were weighted with a queen contiguity and only for the 
first-order, or immediately adjacent neighbors. 
 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error z-Statistic Probability 
     
CONSTANT -24.7166047 11.4747948 -2.1539910 0.0312409 
CrwdHous 1.1197585 0.6277571 1.7837448 0.0744651 
DiabRel -0.1262862 0.1173082 -1.0765334 0.2816888 
LoBirthWt 1.6729943 0.6664706 2.5102296 0.0120653 
LungCanc 0.4578695 0.1739282 2.6325209 0.0084754 
OOcc2012 -0.0924245 0.1413875 -0.6536966 0.5133073 
Pov2012 0.2517075 0.3594870 0.7001855 0.4838115 
Tuberc 0.0647909 0.4413294 0.1468086 0.8832831 
Unempl -0.2539525 0.4392699 -0.5781241 0.5631804 
W_HR2012 0.5050583 0.1663404 3.0362947 0.0023951 
 
 In the spatial lag model, crowded housing moves quite close to significance, 
and its coefficient increases. Low birth weights and lung cancer deaths are still 
statistically significant, but their coefficients are reduced. Interestingly, the p-value for 
poverty moves far away from significance. Finally the weighted homicide rate 
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variable confirms the presence of spatial dependence, with a substantially large 
coefficient, and it is highly statistically significant. 
 This supplementary spatial data analysis confirms what was discovered in the 
previous analyses, in that there are indeed clusters of high homicide rates in different 
sections of the city, largely in the southern parts. Community areas around these parts 
of the city are notably higher in the homicide statistics than the safer areas in the more 
affluent northern and northwestern parts of the city. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this thesis was to analyze the temporal development of homicide rates and 
other adverse socioeconomic factors in the city of Chicago in order to discover the 
effects of the city’s public housing policy decisions. The analysis shows that homicide 
rates of the crime hot spots in the largest concentration of high-rise public housing did 
go down, but conversely there were other areas in the city where new clusters of 
homicide rate hot spots came into being. The effect was also mirrored by changes in 
poverty rates, with the area of the demolition showing reduced poverty, but the 
southern parts of the city showing increases in poverty. 
 The additional analyses further reinforced the differences between homicide 
rates in community areas, and the effects of high-rise public housing projects on 
homicide rates. A linear regression with fixed effects confirmed what the spatial 
analyses suggested, the presence of high-rise public housing increases homicide rates, 
and the demolition of those housing projects does not completely mitigate this 
increase. Furthermore, a spatial lag model also indicated the presence of spatial 
dependence in homicide rates, as well as showing that some adverse health indicators 
are correlated with homicide rates. 
 The focus of this thesis was on a subject that is not widely covered in research 
literature, and the methodology of choice, spatial data analysis, was also something 
now widely applied in the research literature. High homicide rates in inner cities of 
the largest U.S. cities is an important area of study, and this thesis provides new 
knowledge on the subject in the form of an empirical analysis. Previous studies have 
applied ethnographic methods, some game theoretic concepts, and for example some 
social network analysis, but this thesis provides a new perspective on the topic. 
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 Seeing increases in crime rates is in line with the predictions of the game 
theoretic model, where gang members are expected to continue criminal activities 
after their relocation based on the structure of and assumptions inherent in the gang 
lifestyle. The major limitation of the study is confirming the fact that gang members 
moved into areas where rising homicide rates were clustered. This is due to ethical 
limitations, as there is a severe privacy issue inherent in attempting to track movement 
of individuals from one form of housing to another, as well as confirming their gang 
affiliations. Combining the information of those two factors would make individuals 
likely to be identifiable, making the preservation of anonymity problematic. Also, due 
to the limited scope of a master’s thesis, the amount of data that could be handled and 
included in the analysis was limited, and many interesting Census data points were 
excluded. 
 However, for future research on this subject, some type of proxy indicator of 
people’s movement pattern could be devised. One possible option would be to track 
the use of Section 8 vouchers in community areas following the demolition, as that 
was the new method of providing public housing after the large public housing 
projects were discarded. Also, a more comprehensive spatial data analysis that 
includes more variables from Census data, which are examined in closer detail, would 
be a worthwhile pursuit. 
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Appendices 
 
Linear regression - Stata 
Source SS df MS 
 
Number of obs = 1309 
     
F(11, 1297) = 169,74 
Model 469049,395 11 42640,8541 
 
Prob > F = 0,0000 
Residual 325818,371 1297 251,20923 
 
R-squared = 0,5901      
Adj R-squared = 0,5866 
Total 794867,766 1308 607,697068 
 
Root MSE = 15,85        
       
homiciderate Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval        
pubhousing -1,067406 0,8076334 -1,32 0,187 -2,651817 0,5170049 
logpop 1,927535 1,585337 1,22 0,224 -1,18257 5,03764 
pctasian -0,3869041 0,0640607 -6,04 0,000 -0,5125781 -0,2612302 
pctblack 0,3009993 0,034576 8,71 0,000 0,2331682 0,3688304 
pcthispanic -0,1682697 0,0414527 -4,06 0,000 -0,2495913 -0,086948 
pctother -0,0239857 0,6895816 -0,03 0,972 -1,376803 1,328832 
pctpoverty 0,505394 0,0968547 5,22 0,000 0,315385 0,6954029 
pctownerocc 0,0017847 0,0482926 0,04 0,971 -0,0929555 0,0965249 
pctnohsd 0,0737428 0,0820822 0,90 0,369 -0,0872856 0,2347712 
pcthsd 0,8207175 0,0986925 8,32 0,000 0,627103 1,014332 
pctcollege -0,9115294 0,1377842 -6,62 0,000 -1,181834 -0,6412251 
_cons -3,993771 9,260696 -0,43 0,666 -22,16136 14,17381 
 
Linear regression with fixed effect for public housing - Stata 
Source SS df MS 
 
Number of obs = 1309 
     
F(13,1295) = 143,56 
Model 469255,028 13 36096,5406 
 
Prob > F = 0,0000 
Residual 325612,737 1295 251,438407 
 
R-squared = 0,5904      
Adj R-squared = 0,5862 
Total 794867,766 1308 607,697068 
 
Root MSE = 15,857        
       
homiciderate Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval        
pubhousing 
      
1 3,439348 5,167882 0,67 0,506 -6,69899 13,57769 
2 -2,633058 2,731618 -0,96 0,335 -7,991939 2,725823 
3 -3,124514 2,819188 -1,11 0,268 -8,65519 2,406162        
logpop 2,091819 1,59738 1,31 0,191 -1,041918 5,225556 
pctasian -0,3857288 0,0642359 -6,00 0,000 -0,5117466 -0,259711 
pctblack 0,3006231 0,0347369 8,65 0,000 0,2324764 0,3687699 
pcthispanic -0,1680579 0,0418194 -4,02 0,000 -0,2500991 -0,0860167 
pctother -0,0440973 0,6923825 -0,06 0,949 -1,402412 1,314217 
pctpoverty 0,502293 0,0971115 5,17 0,000 0,3117799 0,6928062 
pctownerocc -0,0009386 0,0484225 -0,02 0,985 -0,0959338 0,0940566 
pctnohsd 0,0718783 0,0824829 0,87 0,384 -0,0899364 0,2336931 
pcthsd 0,8289907 0,0997891 8,31 0,000 0,6332247 1,024757 
pctcollege -0,9067786 0,1379481 -6,57 0,000 -1,177405 -0,6361524 
_cons -4,797133 9,307663 -0,52 0,606 -23,05688 13,46262 
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Linear regression with fixed effects for public housing, year - Stata 
Source SS df MS 
 
Number of obs = 1309 
     
F(29,1279) = 70,45 
Model 488849,613 29 16856,8832 
 
Prob > F = 0,0000 
Residual 306018,153 1279 239,263606 
 
R-squared = 0,615      
Adj R-squared = 0,6063 
Total 794867,766 1308 607,697068 
 
Root MSE = 15,468        
       
homiciderate Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval        
pubhousing 
      
1 5,361189 5,073736 1,06 0,291 -4,59257 15,31495 
2 -0,3784674 2,727847 -0,14 0,890 -5,730014 4,973079 
3 -4,155314 2,761962 -1,50 0,133 -9,573788 1,263161        
logpop 1,482291 1,569415 0,94 0,345 -1,596619 4,561201 
pctasian -0,4769785 0,0679379 -7,02 0,000 -0,6102605 -0,3436965 
pctblack 0,2824532 0,0340957 8,28 0,000 0,2155637 0,3493428 
pcthispanic -0,2983607 0,0528628 -5,64 0,000 -0,402068 -0,1946533 
pctother 0,2849758 0,6975592 0,41 0,683 -1,08351 1,653462 
pctpoverty 0,2939613 0,1092771 2,69 0,007 0,0795792 0,5083434 
pctownerocc -0,0270927 0,0477337 -0,57 0,570 -0,1207376 0,0665522 
pctnohsd 0,4338896 0,1219022 3,56 0,000 0,1947393 0,67304 
pcthsd 0,7274708 0,0989587 7,35 0,000 0,5333315 0,92161 
pctcollege -0,8598039 0,1348108 -6,38 0,000 -1,124278 -0,5953293        
year 
      
2001 2,545591 2,497762 1,02 0,308 -2,35457 7,445752 
2002 3,885367 2,508911 1,55 0,122 -1,036666 8,8074 
2003 4,05589 2,526734 1,61 0,109 -0,901108 9,012888 
2004 -1,63057 2,550624 -0,64 0,523 -6,634436 3,373296 
2005 -0,2116245 2,580108 -0,08 0,935 -5,273333 4,850084 
2006 2,381026 2,614718 0,91 0,363 -2,748581 7,510633 
2007 1,311736 2,654096 0,49 0,621 -3,895124 6,518596 
2008 4,597543 2,702894 1,70 0,089 -0,7050493 9,900135 
2009 5,245283 2,75622 1,90 0,057 -0,1619268 10,65249 
2010 4,457474 2,808978 1,59 0,113 -1,053236 9,968184 
2011 4,522208 2,865425 1,58 0,115 -1,099242 10,14366 
2012 6,911856 2,926681 2,36 0,018 1,170233 12,65348 
2013 2,814812 2,97378 0,95 0,344 -3,01921 8,648834 
2014 3,985764 3,004393 1,33 0,185 -1,908316 9,879845 
2015 8,331204 3,047052 2,73 0,006 2,353435 14,30897 
2016 19,26638 3,090805 6,23 0,000 13,20278 25,32998        
_cons -3,735569 9,235028 -0,40 0,686 -21,85304 14,3819 
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Linear regression with fixed effects for public housing, community area - Stata 
Source SS df MS 
 
Number of 
obs = 
1309 
     
F(88, 1220) = 30,39 
Model 545830,822 88 6202,62298 
 
Prob > F = 0,0000 
Residual 249036,944 1220 204,128642 
 
R-squared = 0,6867      
Adj R-squared 
= 
0,6641 
Total 794867,766 1308 607,697068 
 
Root MSE = 14,287        
       
homiciderate Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 95% Conf. 
Interval 
 
       
pubhousing 
      
1 33,1871 17,64672 1,88 0,060 -1,434187 67,80839 
2 29,26884 14,02624 2,09 0,037 1,750615 56,78706 
3 24,74888 13,02659 1,90 0,058 -0,8081234 50,30589        
logpop -29,06 17,41719 -1,67 0,095 -63,23095 5,110959 
pctasian 0,0308025 0,4479231 0,07 0,945 -0,8479825 0,9095875 
pctblack -0,1539104 0,2980601 -0,52 0,606 -0,7386776 0,4308569 
pcthispanic -0,014614 0,1336585 -0,11 0,913 -0,2768401 0,2476121 
pctother 0,5010452 0,9787869 0,51 0,609 -1,419247 2,421337 
pctpoverty -0,1980966 0,1859895 -1,07 0,287 -0,5629914 0,1667982 
pctownerocc -0,901327 0,2215887 -4,07 0,000 -1,336064 -
0,4665898 
pctnohsd 0,0330712 0,172537 0,19 0,848 -0,3054309 0,3715733 
pcthsd 0,7186223 0,2527457 2,84 0,005 0,2227579 1,214487 
pctcollege 0,2171052 0,3269153 0,66 0,507 -0,4242733 0,8584838        
commarea 
      
Archer Heights -1,505556 13,89583 -0,11 0,914 -28,76793 25,75681 
Armour Square -19,67079 29,61851 -0,66 0,507 -77,77964 38,43807 
Ashburn 44,50051 18,4889 2,41 0,016 8,226952 80,77407 
Auburn Gresham 42,63798 28,54581 1,49 0,136 -13,36633 98,6423 
Austin 51,58239 27,006 1,91 0,056 -1,400967 104,5657 
Avalon Park 38,54421 28,38374 1,36 0,175 -17,14215 94,23057 
Avondale -3,145183 7,619479 -0,41 0,680 -18,09392 11,80355 
Belmont Cragin 14,79128 10,20185 1,45 0,147 -5,223837 34,80639 
Beverly 32,29782 15,22027 2,12 0,034 2,437014 62,15863 
Bridgeport -4,892846 10,70172 -0,46 0,648 -25,88865 16,10296 
Brighton Park 14,42206 9,703654 1,49 0,137 -4,61564 33,45976 
Burnside 37,22394 30,52497 1,22 0,223 -22,66331 97,1112 
Calumet Heights 42,55856 27,85576 1,53 0,127 -12,09195 97,20906 
Chatham 44,10572 27,65153 1,60 0,111 -10,1441 98,35554 
Chicago Lawn 31,43527 15,81228 1,99 0,047 0,412988 62,45755 
Clearing 6,810443 12,50583 0,54 0,586 -17,72487 31,34575 
Douglas -27,52415 12,68749 -2,17 0,030 -52,41586 -2,632439 
Dunning 17,91513 12,09636 1,48 0,139 -5,816842 41,64711 
East Garfield Park 44,00674 25,30541 1,74 0,082 -5,640209 93,65368 
East Side 11,69296 13,62704 0,86 0,391 -15,04207 38,42799 
Edgewater 5,158987 9,217529 0,56 0,576 -12,92498 23,24295 
Edison Park 8,61178 14,21732 0,61 0,545 -19,28134 36,50489 
Englewood 65,49531 26,549 2,47 0,014 13,40856 117,5821 
Forest Glen 28,40455 12,60304 2,25 0,024 3,678502 53,13059 
Fuller Park 32,40192 28,55645 1,13 0,257 -23,62327 88,42711 
Gage Park 26,78157 11,95053 2,24 0,025 3,335705 50,22744 
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Garfield Ridge 26,96891 13,09654 2,06 0,040 1,274671 52,66315 
Grand Boulevard -3,586465 16,52616 -0,22 0,828 -36,00932 28,83639 
Greater Grand 
Crossing 
51,65851 27,24913 1,90 0,058 -1,801833 105,1189 
Hegewisch 7,550602 15,6741 0,48 0,630 -23,20057 38,30178 
Hermosa -2,555136 10,91127 -0,23 0,815 -23,96207 18,8518 
Humboldt park 39,01143 13,24074 2,95 0,003 13,03428 64,98857 
Hyde Park 2,104339 13,84164 0,15 0,879 -25,05171 29,26039 
Irving Park 3,94307 6,694751 0,59 0,556 -9,191431 17,07757 
Jefferson Park 4,627253 9,54733 0,48 0,628 -14,10375 23,35826 
Kenwood 0,8935943 21,34813 0,04 0,967 -40,98952 42,77671 
Lake View 12,77276 14,48842 0,88 0,378 -15,65222 41,19775 
Lincoln Park 17,03855 13,43607 1,27 0,205 -9,321808 43,39892 
Lincoln Square -4,322187 7,458718 -0,58 0,562 -18,95552 10,31115 
Logan Square 10,12589 9,568236 1,06 0,290 -8,646127 28,89792 
Loop 6,468319 11,27574 0,57 0,566 -15,65368 28,59032 
Lower West Side 1,251225 9,245782 0,14 0,892 -16,88817 19,39062 
McKinley Park -1,809648 12,46048 -0,15 0,885 -26,25598 22,63669 
Montclare -7,98703 12,28728 -0,65 0,516 -32,09357 16,11952 
Morgan Park 42,54579 21,00062 2,03 0,043 1,344453 83,74713 
Mount 
Greenwood 
16,98807 14,56663 1,17 0,244 -11,59036 45,56649 
Near North Side -3,60089 9,741265 -0,37 0,712 -22,71238 15,5106 
Near South Side -17,00346 10,51236 -1,62 0,106 -37,62777 3,620847 
Near West Side 0 (omitted) 
    
New City 38,77388 10,47932 3,70 0,000 18,2144 59,33337 
North Center 5,613078 9,605493 0,58 0,559 -13,23204 24,45819 
North Lawndale 43,21313 25,37588 1,70 0,089 -6,572063 92,99833 
North Park -2,084171 11,28579 -0,18 0,854 -24,22589 20,05755 
Norwood Park 20,70999 12,25763 1,69 0,091 -3,338376 44,75836 
Oakland -17,65404 26,84265 -0,66 0,511 -70,31691 35,00882 
Ohare -25,02417 10,31243 -2,43 0,015 -45,25622 -4,79211 
Portage Park 7,397372 9,886741 0,75 0,454 -11,99953 26,79427 
Pullman 9,187001 23,94756 0,38 0,701 -37,79597 56,16997 
Riverdale 7,007511 26,56039 0,26 0,792 -45,10159 59,11661 
Rogers Park -0,6847207 11,08241 -0,06 0,951 -22,42742 21,05798 
Roseland 58,49149 28,66593 2,04 0,042 2,251497 114,7315 
South Chicago 41,39025 19,7497 2,10 0,036 2,643095 80,1374 
South Deering 29,36304 19,00972 1,54 0,123 -7,932335 66,65841 
South Lawndale 23,51768 10,25552 2,29 0,022 3,397283 43,63809 
South Shore 31,11005 27,95172 1,11 0,266 -23,72871 85,94881 
Uptown 3,717332 10,18138 0,37 0,715 -16,25762 23,69228 
Washington 
Heights 
51,0773 28,70027 1,78 0,075 -5,230059 107,3847 
Washington Park 32,7143 26,2959 1,24 0,214 -18,87589 84,30449 
West Elsdon 12,39796 14,83211 0,84 0,403 -16,70131 41,49723 
West Englewood 70,28241 27,23795 2,58 0,010 16,844 123,7208 
West Garfield 
Park 
58,93571 26,29419 2,24 0,025 7,348876 110,5225 
West Lawn 23,2102 13,75999 1,69 0,092 -3,785665 50,20607 
West Pullman 63,90821 27,01583 2,37 0,018 10,90557 116,9109 
West Ridge 11,53403 8,002719 1,44 0,150 -4,166587 27,23465 
West Town 16,51885 11,04282 1,50 0,135 -5,146175 38,18387 
Woodlawn 17,8553 24,57561 0,73 0,468 -30,35983 66,07044        
_cons 158,7321 80,25033 1,98 0,048 1,288131 316,176 
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Linear regression with fixed effects for public housing, community area, year - Stata 
Source SS df MS 
 
Number of 
obs = 
1309 
     
F(104, 1204) 
= 
28,04 
Model 562604,76 104 5409,66116 
 
Prob > F = 0,0000 
Residual 232263,005 1204 192,909473 
 
R-squared = 0,7078      
Adj R-
squared = 
0,6826 
Total 794867,766 1308 607,697068 
 
Root MSE = 13,889        
       
homiciderate Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval        
pubhousing 
      
1 47,56625 17,79019 2,67 0,008 12,66303 82,46947 
2 45,27854 14,4159 3,14 0,002 16,99547 73,56161 
3 38,8968 13,45388 2,89 0,004 12,50114 65,29246        
logpop -32,81856 17,73013 -1,85 0,064 -67,60395 1,966835 
pctasian -0,1838188 0,45175 -0,41 0,684 -1,070123 0,7024859 
pctblack -0,2045532 0,2908936 -0,70 0,482 -0,7752679 0,3661616 
pcthispanic -0,0849017 0,1462269 -0,58 0,562 -0,3717895 0,2019861 
pctother -0,0590287 0,9645166 -0,06 0,951 -1,951349 1,833291 
pctpoverty -0,3759569 0,2066277 -1,82 0,069 -0,7813473 0,0294334 
pctownerocc -0,4696189 0,2309043 -2,03 0,042 -0,9226384 -
0,0165993 
pctnohsd 0,6335945 0,3015511 2,10 0,036 0,0419704 1,225219 
pcthsd 0,9053425 0,2806724 3,23 0,001 0,3546812 1,456004 
pctcollege 0,6777234 0,350016 1,94 0,053 -0,0089855 1,364432        
commarea 
      
Archer Heights -23,64628 14,13398 -1,67 0,095 -51,37626 4,083695 
Armour Square -10,86993 29,56241 -0,37 0,713 -68,8695 47,12964 
Ashburn 18,74082 19,10464 0,98 0,327 -18,74128 56,22291 
Auburn Gresham 34,44636 28,51775 1,21 0,227 -21,50364 90,39636 
Austin 46,50656 27,3259 1,70 0,089 -7,105112 100,1182 
Avalon Park 19,5778 28,11826 0,70 0,486 -35,58844 74,74404 
Avondale -6,990966 7,450706 -0,94 0,348 -21,60878 7,626843 
Belmont Cragin 1,24273 10,75416 0,12 0,908 -19,85625 22,34171 
Beverly 18,00693 15,2058 1,18 0,237 -11,82588 47,83974 
Bridgeport -6,235135 10,57863 -0,59 0,556 -26,98974 14,51947 
Brighton Park 0,4407452 9,938007 0,04 0,965 -19,05699 19,93848 
Burnside 20,07474 30,14191 0,67 0,506 -39,06178 79,21125 
Calumet Heights 22,3369 27,64993 0,81 0,419 -31,9105 76,58431 
Chatham 42,43806 27,18236 1,56 0,119 -10,892 95,76811 
Chicago Lawn 21,785 16,0954 1,35 0,176 -9,793149 53,36315 
Clearing -16,30608 12,97093 -1,26 0,209 -41,75421 9,142063 
Douglas -28,42925 12,4369 -2,29 0,022 -52,82965 -4,028853 
Dunning -4,077688 12,80102 -0,32 0,750 -29,19248 21,0371 
East Garfield Park 44,72698 24,82785 1,80 0,072 -3,983682 93,43764 
East Side -9,68433 13,82572 -0,70 0,484 -36,80951 17,44085 
Edgewater 15,86492 9,540946 1,66 0,097 -2,853813 34,58364 
Edison Park -13,52048 14,37394 -0,94 0,347 -41,72124 14,68028 
Englewood 63,32147 26,31795 2,41 0,016 11,68732 114,9556 
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Forest Glen 11,99068 12,9056 0,93 0,353 -13,32928 37,31064 
Fuller Park 25,89422 27,984 0,93 0,355 -29,00859 80,79704 
Gage Park 6,174958 12,49073 0,49 0,621 -18,33107 30,68098 
Garfield Ridge 1,052309 13,95592 0,08 0,940 -26,32832 28,43294 
Grand Boulevard -12,41176 16,98016 -0,73 0,465 -45,72575 20,90224 
Greater Grand 
Crossing 
50,60797 26,82744 1,89 0,059 -2,025749 103,2417 
Hegewisch -17,12834 15,91606 -1,08 0,282 -48,35464 14,09795 
Hermosa -15,78105 10,90264 -1,45 0,148 -37,17135 5,609238 
Humboldt park 33,74731 13,38561 2,52 0,012 7,485593 60,00903 
Hyde Park 20,22214 15,20256 1,33 0,184 -9,604313 50,04859 
Irving Park 1,025098 6,541452 0,16 0,876 -11,80881 13,85901 
Jefferson Park -10,44693 9,679538 -1,08 0,281 -29,43757 8,543705 
Kenwood 12,49222 21,13612 0,59 0,555 -28,97551 53,95994 
Lake View 31,10708 15,08516 2,06 0,039 1,510963 60,7032 
Lincoln Park 32,468 14,30085 2,27 0,023 4,410646 60,52536 
Lincoln Square 3,559034 7,889229 0,45 0,652 -11,91913 19,0372 
Logan Square 15,80942 9,46028 1,67 0,095 -2,751051 34,36988 
Loop 20,70515 13,38315 1,55 0,122 -5,551735 46,96203 
Lower West Side -0,6618566 9,002786 -0,07 0,941 -18,32475 17,00104 
McKinley Park -15,51182 12,47167 -1,24 0,214 -39,98044 8,956806 
Montclare -25,79328 12,39744 -2,08 0,038 -50,11626 -1,470303 
Morgan Park 24,46292 20,97643 1,17 0,244 -16,6915 65,61733 
Mount Greenwood -9,226052 14,95679 -0,62 0,537 -38,57032 20,11822 
Near North Side -3,9608 9,530812 -0,42 0,678 -22,65964 14,73805 
Near South Side -23,36093 10,47795 -2,23 0,026 -43,918 -2,803869 
Near West Side 0 (omitted) 
    
New City 30,06729 10,81933 2,78 0,006 8,84046 51,29412 
North Center 10,75555 10,05051 1,07 0,285 -8,962904 30,474 
North Lawndale 45,01507 25,07651 1,80 0,073 -4,183448 94,21359 
North Park -3,293066 11,84358 -0,28 0,781 -26,52941 19,94327 
Norwood Park -0,7364676 12,69217 -0,06 0,954 -25,6377 24,16476 
Oakland -11,53868 26,29524 -0,44 0,661 -63,12826 40,0509 
Ohare -27,43785 10,23977 -2,68 0,007 -47,52763 -7,348067 
Portage Park -3,557044 10,17769 -0,35 0,727 -23,52503 16,41094 
Pullman -1,889191 23,5665 -0,08 0,936 -48,12517 44,34679 
Riverdale 11,98573 25,9521 0,46 0,644 -38,93064 62,9021 
Rogers Park 10,7539 10,99642 0,98 0,328 -10,82038 32,32818 
Roseland 45,80211 28,65008 1,60 0,110 -10,40751 102,0117 
South Chicago 35,19359 19,56284 1,80 0,072 -3,187456 73,57464 
South Deering 12,48298 19,00548 0,66 0,511 -24,80457 49,77052 
South Lawndale 12,90604 10,87513 1,19 0,236 -8,430269 34,24235 
South Shore 37,56051 27,46598 1,37 0,172 -16,326 91,44702 
Uptown 17,43525 10,49754 1,66 0,097 -3,160251 38,03074 
Washington 
Heights 
33,15339 28,6738 1,16 0,248 -23,10278 89,40955 
Washington Park 38,7659 25,67291 1,51 0,131 -11,60272 89,13452 
West Elsdon -14,44351 15,27057 -0,95 0,344 -44,4034 15,51638 
West Englewood 59,62011 27,32729 2,18 0,029 6,005714 113,2345 
West Garfield 
Park 
57,93981 25,9102 2,24 0,026 7,10566 108,774 
West Lawn -3,548594 14,38553 -0,25 0,805 -31,7721 24,67491 
West Pullman 47,17659 27,06097 1,74 0,082 -5,915314 100,2685 
West Ridge 13,98276 7,846188 1,78 0,075 -1,41096 29,37648 
West Town 26,14246 11,04235 2,37 0,018 4,478065 47,80686 
Woodlawn 24,34841 24,02368 1,01 0,311 -22,78452 71,48134        
year 
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2001 2,335331 2,25886 1,03 0,301 -2,096409 6,767071 
2002 3,508939 2,311354 1,52 0,129 -1,025789 8,043668 
2003 3,511159 2,392498 1,47 0,142 -1,182769 8,205088 
2004 -2,341146 2,496863 -0,94 0,349 -7,239833 2,55754 
2005 -1,088391 2,619556 -0,42 0,678 -6,227793 4,051011 
2006 1,336656 2,756569 0,48 0,628 -4,071558 6,744869 
2007 0,1016447 2,904722 0,03 0,972 -5,597234 5,800523 
2008 3,287026 3,055122 1,08 0,282 -2,706928 9,28098 
2009 3,760081 3,218439 1,17 0,243 -2,554291 10,07445 
2010 2,807943 3,388399 0,83 0,407 -3,83988 9,455767 
2011 3,072926 3,499282 0,88 0,380 -3,792442 9,938294 
2012 5,775714 3,611761 1,60 0,110 -1,310331 12,86176 
2013 1,505216 3,781449 0,40 0,691 -5,913746 8,924179 
2014 2,608489 3,931203 0,66 0,507 -5,10428 10,32126 
2015 6,977585 4,077349 1,71 0,087 -1,021914 14,97708 
2016 17,93996 4,218443 4,25 0,000 9,663649 26,21628        
_cons 136,2558 84,93435 1,60 0,109 -30,37998 302,8916 
 
 
OLS and Spatial 2SLS – GeodaSpace 
 
SUMMARY OF OUTPUT: ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES 
 
      
Data set: geo_export_e426f717-8227-4798-8332-af2ec8482f22.dbf 
Weights matrix: File: ChicagoWt-Q1.gal 
Dependent Variable : HR2012 
 
Number of Observations: 77 
Mean dependent var: 20.8849 
 
Number of Variables: 9 
S.D. dependent var : 23.0781 
 
Degrees of Freedom: 68 
R-squared: 0.6370 
    
Adjusted R-squared: 0.5943 
    
Sum squared residual: 14693.905 
 
F-statistic: 14.9150 
Sigma-square: 216.087 
 
Prob(F-statistic): 2.299e-12 
S.E. of regression: 14.700 
 
Log likelihood: -311.436 
Sigma-square ML: 190.830 
 
Akaike info criterion: 640.873 
S.E of regression ML: 13.8141 
 
Schwarz criterion: 661.967 
      
      
 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-Statistic Probability 
      
 
CONSTANT -29.5146060 12.4608699 -2.3685831 0.0207042 
 
CrwdHous 0.9031612 0.6838020 1.3207933 0.1909981 
 
DiabRel -0.1645418 0.1278704 -1.2867857 0.2025324 
 
LoBirthWt 1.9601490 0.7233107 2.7099681 0.0085088 
 
LungCanc 0.4999914 0.1900838 2.6303732 0.0105405 
 
OOcc2012 -0.0248421 0.1530815 -0.1622800 0.8715666 
 
Pov2012 0.6755164 0.3632114 1.8598435 0.0672335 
 
Tuberc -0.1204474 0.4792192 -0.2513409 0.8023085 
 
Unempl -0.0374834 0.4752213 -0.0788757 0.9373632 
      
      
REGRESSION DIAGNOSTICS 
    
MULTICOLLINEARITY CONDITION NUMBER 25.616 
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TEST ON NORMALITY OF ERRORS 
    
TEST DF VALUE PROB 
  
Jarque-Bera 2 39.150 0.0000 
  
      
DIAGNOSTICS FOR HETEROSKEDASTICITY 
   
RANDOM COEFFICIENTS 
    
TEST DF VALUE PROB 
  
Breusch-Pagan test 8 54.705 0.0000 
  
Koenker-Bassett test 8 21.341 0.0063 
  
      
DIAGNOSTICS FOR SPATIAL DEPENDENCE 
   
TEST MI/DF VALUE PROB 
  
Lagrange Multiplier 
(lag) 
1 4.051 0.0441 
  
Robust LM (lag) 1 5.541 0.0186 
  
Lagrange 
Multiplier(error) 
1 0.336 0.5619 
  
Robust LM (error) 1 1.826 0.1766 
  
Lagrange Multiplier 
(SARMA) 
2 5.877 0.0529 
  
      
END OF REPORT 
     
 
SUMMARY OF OUTPUT: SPATIAL TWO STAGE LEAST SQUARES 
 
      
Data set: geo_export_e426f717-8227-4798-8332-af2ec8482f22.dbf 
Weights matrix: File: ChicagoWt-Q1.gal 
Dependent Variable: HR2012 
 
Number of Observations: 77 
Mean dependent var: 20.8849 
 
Number of Variables: 10 
S.D. dependent var: 23.0781 
 
Degrees of Freedom: 67 
Pseudo R-squared: 0.6584 
    
Spatial Pseudo R-
squared: 
0.6485 
    
      
      
 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error z-Statistic Probability 
      
 
CONSTANT -24.7166047 11.4747948 -2.1539910 0.0312409 
 
CrwdHous 1.1197585 0.6277571 1.7837448 0.0744651 
 
DiabRel -0.1262862 0.1173082 -1.0765334 0.2816888 
 
LoBirthWt 1.6729943 0.6664706 2.5102296 0.0120653 
 
LungCanc 0.4578695 0.1739282 2.6325209 0.0084754 
 
OOcc2012 -0.0924245 0.1413875 -0.6536966 0.5133073 
 
Pov2012 0.2517075 0.3594870 0.7001855 0.4838115 
 
Tuberc 0.0647909 0.4413294 0.1468086 0.8832831 
 
Unempl -0.2539525 0.4392699 -0.5781241 0.5631804 
 
W_HR2012 0.5050583 0.1663404 3.0362947 0.0023951 
      
Instrumented: W_HR2012 
    
Instruments: W_CrwdHous, W_DiabRel, W_LoBirthWt, W_LungCanc, W_OOcc2012, 
W_Pov2012, W_Tuberc, W_Unempl 
 
      
DIAGNOSTICS FOR SPATIAL DEPENDENCE 
   
TEST MI/DF VALUE PROB 
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Anselin-Kelejian Test 1 1.424 0.2327 
  
      
END OF REPORT 
     
 
